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Abstract 
 
Essays on Executive Compensation 
Won Yong Kim 
Jacqueline L. Garner, Ph.D. (Supervisor) 
 
 
This dissertation investigates one of the most critical issues in recent corporate 
governance research, executive compensation. It includes two essays on how executives should 
be paid and which parties can monitor those decisions.  
First essay, "Are Foreign Investors Really Beneficial? Evidence from South Korea", 
examines whether foreign investors impact corporate governance by analyzing the relation 
between foreign share ownership and pay-performance sensitivity.  The essay tests our 
hypotheses using a sample of Korean firms, an emerging market with unique characteristics.  The 
essay finds that firms with higher foreign share ownership have greater significant pay-
performance sensitivity, suggesting that foreign investors may be good monitors.  The essay 
controls for the endogenous bias that foreign investors may only invest in firms that have already 
exhibited good governance practices, and the results are unchanged.  Moreover, the essay finds 
some evidence that changes in foreign ownership (Hartzell and Starks, 2003) are associated with 
long-run positive changes in pay-performance sensitivity, but not the other way around.  The 
results suggest that foreign shareholders promote improved corporate governance in Korea, 
consistent with Aggarwal et al (2010).  
Second essay, "Does a Salary Cap Really Work?", investigates the effectiveness of salary 
cap system in Korea in order to give the policy implication to the U.S. government on limiting 
executive compensation.  The essay investigates the effectiveness of a form of an executive salary 
cap system and finds that only firms with a high level of effective external monitors set their 
salary cap significantly sensitive to firm performance (cap-performance sensitivity). The 
difference between the salary cap and actual pay (the gap) varies by the level of monitoring. 
Therefore, the existence of an efficient external monitoring system may be critical for a salary cap 
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system to be successful. It also finds evidence suggesting that incentive structures created by a 
salary cap may properly work only in the presence of an effective external monitoring system by 
improving better pay-performance sensitivity. Since it is almost impossible to determine an 
optimal level for a salary cap, it concludes that improving firm-level governance may be more 
important to thwart highly excessive compensation than legalizing the upper limit. 
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Essay 1. Are Foreign Investors Really Beneficial? Evidence from South Korea 
 
1. Introduction 
 
  Market globalization and stock market liberalization often opens a domestic 
stock market to foreign investors.  The extant literature suggests that foreign investors 
have a preference for firms with certain characteristics (Kang and Stulz, 1997; Dalhquist 
and Robertsson, 2001; Gompers and Metrick, 2001).  They argue that foreigners can 
reduce informational asymmetries because their preferences include firm recognition and 
investor influence.  However, the impact of foreign investors in emerging markets is 
unclear, since often shareholder protection is weak. The extant literature provides some 
evidence of the impact of foreign investors in emerging markets, but it is limited.  Gillan 
and Starks (2003) find that foreign investors prompt changes in corporate governance 
practices and Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that firms with high levels of foreign 
ownership have higher firm valuations, better operating, performance, and lower capital 
expenditures, consistent with an ability of these investors to monitor.  In a very recent 
study, Aggarwal et al. (2010) find that changes in foreign institutional ownership are 
associated with improved corporate governance all over the world, specifically the ability 
to remove poorly performing CEOs.   While Hartzell and Starks (2003) document a 
positive relation between pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and 
the level and concentration of institutional investors in the U.S., there is little evidence 
regarding the monitoring ability of foreign investors on pay performance sensitivity.  
Using South Korea (hereafter referred to as “Korea”) as an example, this study 
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investigates whether levels of foreign investment can improve corporate governance in an 
emerging market.   
 Emerging markets often present challenges to traditional governance studies.  As 
Aggarwal et al. (2010) point out, while market globalization has reduced the cost of 
capital (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000), limitations exist because insiders and corporate 
shareholders may pursue their own interests (Stulz, 2005).  A specific challenge for 
Korea is pointed out by La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) which argues that investor protection 
in Korea is weaker than that in the United States (hereafter referred to as “U.S.”).  
Moreover, Korea is home to some firms with a very unique ownership structure, chaebols.  
Historically, chaebols have been associated with weak governance systems.  However, in 
the process of recovering from the financial crisis that occurred during 1997 to 1998, 
Korean companies were forced to improve their corporate governance through 
government requirements and investors.  The Korean government required chaebol firms 
to improve their governance system as a condition of resolving their financial distress.  In 
addition, chaebol firms were required to enhance investor protection in order to attract 
foreign investment.  Due to the weak country level governance as well as the presence of 
chaebols, Korea provides a unique environment to examine whether corporate 
governance can be improved in an emerging market.   
In order to measure the degree of corporate governance improvement, we 
examine the impact of foreign ownership on pay-performance sensitivity.  The extant 
literature is filled with studies which examine the relation between changes in 
performance with changes in executive compensation, particularly for U.S. firms.  Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) find that pay-performance sensitivity historically exists in the U.S.  
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Mehran (1995) shows that firm performance is positively related to equity-based 
compensation, and Hartzell and Starks (2003) suggest that institutional ownership is 
positively related to pay-performance sensitivity and negatively related to the level of 
compensation.  However, the evidence of the existence of pay-performance sensitivity 
may be less prevalent in other markets.  Kaplan (1994) studies Japanese companies and 
finds that there is pay-performance sensitivity but less so than found in the U.S.  Kato et 
al. (2007) investigate Korean companies from 1998 to 2001 and find that pay-
performance sensitivity is only significant in non-chaebol companies.   
Unlike previous studies which examine the impact of the “chaebol” factor, we 
focus on the impact of the ownership structure in Korea while controlling for the 
“chaebol” factor.  Kato et al. (2007) suggest that “chaebol” is an important factor in 
determining the level of investor protection in Korea.  However, because chaebol reforms 
began in 1998, and the Kato et al. (2007) study ends in 2001, the entire impact of the 
reforms may not have been realized in their study.  Since most chaebol firms were 
encouraged to make reforms, the “chaebol” factor may not be the sole delineator of good 
versus bad corporate governance.  Indeed, chaebol companies have tried to improve their 
corporate governance by increasing the number of outside directors and foreign investors 
(Yanagimachi, 2004). 
 Another problem with using “chaebol” to delineate firms is that chaebols are not 
clearly defined.  Usually, the term “chaebol” refers to large family-owned Korean 
conglomerates.  However, the cut-off for size may be too arbitrary.  Therefore, most 
studies use the monthly announcement from the Korean Fair Trade Committee (hereafter 
referred to as “KFTC”) to determine whether a firm is included in chaebol (Campbell and 
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Keys, 2002; Kim and Lee, 2003; Kato et al., 2007).  Moreover, a firm classified as non-
chaebol does not preclude it being family-owned.  In fact, many non-chaebol companies 
are highly family-owned, but are simply smaller than chaebol companies.  
For these reasons, this paper focuses on the role of foreign investors in Korea, an 
emerging market.  Core et al. (1999) posit that U.S. CEO compensation is highly 
influenced by a firm’s ownership structure.  Baek et al. (2004) find that firms with higher 
ownership concentration by unaffiliated foreign investors experienced a smaller reduction 
in their share values during the Asian financial crisis.  Koo and Maeng (2006) show 
evidence that foreign ownership improves a firm’s accessibility to external finance.  
D'Souza et al. (2005) find that higher foreign ownership is associated with efficiency 
gains for newly privatized firms.  The role of institutional investors as a monitor in the 
U.S. is widely studied.  In an emerging market, foreign investors may be better monitors 
than domestic institutional investors since the foreign investors have more expertise in 
monitoring and fewer conflicts of interest than their domestic counterparts.  Ferreira and 
Matos (2008) confirm that the benefit of foreign investors on firm value is their 
monitoring ability, which arises from their independence and absence of business ties 
from firm management.  Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) find that outside stock 
ownership can mitigate agency problems caused by managers or expropriation by 
insiders.  Foreign investors have been associated with permanent value increases 
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008) as well as with corporate governance improvement (Gillan 
and Starks, 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2010).  However, if foreign investors are only 
interested in short-term returns as documented by Gozzi et al. (2006) and Sarkissian and 
Schill (2006), they may be harmful to the firm.  Therefore, the main purpose of the paper 
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is to determine whether foreign investors are beneficial by investigating the relation 
between pay-performance sensitivity and the proportion of foreign shares. 
 We find that foreign investors are associated with pay-performance sensitivity.  
First, we find that pay-performance sensitivity is more significant in the firms with higher 
foreign share ownership.  Even after controlling for the probability that foreign 
shareholders only invest in firms that exhibit good corporate governance (Leuz et al., 
2009), our results remain.  We find some interesting results when we investigate the 
relation between foreign blockholders and pay-performance sensitivity.  If foreign 
blockholders exist, only firms with 10% to 30% foreign blockholder ownership have 
significant pay-performance sensitivity, but this association is not present at higher levels 
of block ownership, suggesting a non-linear relation.  Also, if foreign blockholders are 
absent, only firms with high level of foreign shares have significant pay-performance 
sensitivity, suggesting foreign shareholders still play a critical role even without any 
blockholders. 
 Our work contributes to the extant literature on foreign investors by indentifying 
the incremental impact of these shareholders on the governance of emerging market firms.  
Korean firms appear to benefit from the monitoring ability of foreign shareholders which 
are associated with improved pay-performance sensitivity.  This paper proceeds as 
follows.  Section 2 provides background information and the hypotheses of this paper.  In 
Section 3, we introduce the sample and define the variables used in the paper along with 
the methodology and summary statistics.  Section 4 details the empirical findings of the 
study, and Section 5 provides some robustness tests.  Lastly, Section 6 provides some 
concluding remarks.  
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2. Background and hypotheses 
 
 The chaebol system was at the center of the development of the Korean economy 
prior to the financial crisis in 1997.  Before the crisis, most Korean companies primarily 
utilized bank debt as their source of financing (Baek et al., 2004). 1   The Korean 
government could heavily influence the companies by controlling the lending banks, and 
government decisions were often made not for economic reasons, but for political ones.  
Hence, even though some firm projects failed, they were supported by the government.  
Therefore, losses to the firms from a failed project were relatively small, while benefits 
from a successful project could be large.   
 In addition to the risk-shifting ability of chaebols, the ownership structure of these 
firms is very complicated, which allows a family to control the large conglomerate.  
Because of the complicated cross-ownership, voting rights for the family in chaebol firms 
usually exceeds the cash flow rights.  Francis et al. (2005) show that when cash flow 
rights are separated from voting rights, information credibility decreases.  Joh (2003) 
finds that Korean firms with a high disparity between voting and cash flow rights suffer 
low profitability prior to the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis.  In addition, prior to the 
crisis, it was uncommon for Korean firms to have outside directors.  As with U.S. 
reforms like Sarbanes-Oxley, reforms in Korea value outside directors, and a board 
without these independent directors is generally considered a poor monitoring system 
(Choi et al., 2007).  
                                                 
1 Similar to Japan, Korean firms heavily relied on bank debt from "main banks".  Because main banks are 
very knowledgeable about the firm, this system can be beneficial.  However, if the main bank faces 
difficulties, its client firms may also suffer substantial losses (Kang and Stulz, 2000; Bae et al., 2002; 
Baek et al., 2004). 
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 However, the financial crisis in 1997 dramatically changed the Korean economic 
environment.  Bank failure and recession worsened the chaebol firms’ financial situations.  
In addition, since the leverage of Korean firms was so high, many firms faced solvency 
issues.  In order to attract investors, chaebol firms were compelled to improve their 
corporate governance.  Also, the Korean government required companies to enhance the 
level of investor protection.  For example, the Korean regulatory system began to require 
that public firms have more than 25% independent (outside) directors (Choi et al., 2007). 
 In addition to the Korean regulatory requirements regarding directors, which were 
intended to improve corporate governance, the Korean government believed that 
attracting foreign investment was essential for the Korean economic recovery.  For 
example, the Korean market became fully open to foreign investors in May 1998, and 
they were allowed to participate in mergers and acquisitions in February 1998.  Due to 
the deregulation of foreign investment, the proportion of foreign shares in the Korean 
stock market drastically increased after 1997 as seen in Figure 1.  Although the 
proportion of foreign shares decreased after 2004, the fraction of foreign investment in 
the Korean stock market was still over 30% as of 2008.  In addition, the market value of 
stocks acquired by foreign investors has continued to increase even after 2004 as seen in 
Figure 2. 
 The role of foreign investors in Korea may be similar to the role of institutional 
shareholders in the U.S.  Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that institutional ownership 
concentration is positively related to the pay-performance sensitivity of executive 
compensation.  For example, CalPERS and TIAA-CREF are influential in improving 
corporate governance of firms, both domestic and foreign (Gillan and Starks, 2003).  
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Evidence by Khanna and Palepu (1999) suggests that foreign institutional investors are 
good monitors in India, while domestic institutional investors are not.  They find superior 
performance for firms with high levels of foreign ownership, even controlling for the 
possibility that foreign investors only invest in well-managed firms.   
However, previous studies regarding the role of foreign investors in Korea are 
ambiguous.  Studies citing problems with foreign investors include Sul (2005) which 
finds that firms with higher levels of foreign shares have lower levels of fixed investment; 
this finding implies that foreign shares may lead to low investment.  Moreover, Park 
(2004) and Kim and Sul (2006) find that the level of foreign shares is positively related to 
the level of dividends, suggesting that foreign shares may increase the possibility for 
excessive dividends which could diminish the growth potential of the firms. On the other 
hand, since overinvestment is cited as one of the factors that led to the financial crisis in 
Korea,(Chang et al., 1998; Corsetti et al., 1998) it is possible that firms with high foreign 
shares have now returned to an optimal level of investment    For the same reason, higher 
dividend levels may not directly imply that foreigners are simply interested in larger short 
term returns.  In fact, Bin et al. (2005) find no evidence that the level of foreign shares 
directly explains the level of dividend.   
Studies citing the benefits of foreign investors include Choi et al. (2007) which 
find that foreign investor holdings in Korea have a greater impact on firm value than their 
domestic counterparts.  Several studies suggest that the level of foreign shares is 
positively related to firm performance (Baek et al., 2004; Koo and Maeng, 2006; Cho and 
Sul, 2006).  Furthermore, Kim and Sul (2007) find a positive market reaction from an 
announcement that foreign investors will acquire more than 5% of a company’s shares.  
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Hence, foreign investors may play a positive role in monitoring the firms in Korea.   
Therefore, our first hypothesis is as follows.   
 
Hypothesis 1: Pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to the proportion of 
foreign shares 
 
 While we expect that higher foreign ownership will be positively related to pay-
performance sensitivity, we recognize that every foreign investor is not identical.  Indeed, 
the bargaining power of a foreign shareholder in each company may be different.  If 
foreign investors are blockholders, they may have more power in the firms, and are 
therefore more interested in enhancing corporate governance in an effort to maximize 
firm value.  Lee and Kim (2009) find that the existence of foreign blockholders and 
foreign directors lowers agency costs and is associated with improved value in Korean 
firms.  Our second hypothesis is therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to the proportion of the 
foreign blockholders. 
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3. Data and Empirical Methods 
 
3.1. Sample 
 
 Our sample consists of 164 firms from KOSPI 200, which is the Korean large-cap 
stock index, similar to the S&P 500 Index in the U.S.  We collect original data from 2001 
to 2006, but since our final sample requires lagged terms and changes in lagged terms, 
our final sample consists of a panel dataset of 656 observations, spanning from 2003 to 
2006.  All compensation and ownership data are collected from annual reports, equivalent 
to Form 10-K in the U.S., which firms are required to file each year with the Korean 
Financial Supervisory Service (referred to as “KFSS”).2  We collect stock prices and 
foreign share data from KOSCOM Datamall and financial statements from Thomson 
Datastream.  We also use the annual governance assessment grade announced by Korea 
Corporate Governance Service (referred to as “KCGS”). 
3.2. Pay-performance sensitivity variables 
 
In order to compute pay-performance sensitivity, we need a compensation 
measure as a dependent variable and a performance measure as an independent variable.  
Unlike regulations in the U.S., those in Korea do not require public corporations to report 
executive and director compensation separately.  Regulation only requires the reporting 
                                                 
2 All regulatory filings in Korea can be obtained from the KFSS website (http://dart.fss.or.kr), which is 
similar to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (referred to as “SEC”) Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval System (referred to as “EDGAR”). 
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of total and average compensation that is paid to all directors, executives, and auditors.  
In addition, most Korean firms pay only cash compensation.  In our sample, only 19% of 
firms utilize option pay in at least one year, but since the firms do not grant options every 
year, only 8% of our firm-year observations include option compensation.3  Therefore, 
our sample of firms with option compensation is similar to that of Kato et al. (2007) and 
is in stark contrast to U.S. firms.  In the U.S., 87% of firms not only use option 
compensation, but also use it every year.4  Kato et al. (2007), in their study of pay-
performance sensitivity, utilize only cash compensation to estimate pay-performance 
sensitivity.  Given that most Korean firms only pay cash compensation, our primary tests 
utilize log changes in total cash compensation and average cash compensation as 
dependent variables in each model, consistent with Kato et al. (2007).  However, since 
some firms utilize options, ignoring this form of compensation could hamper the 
interpretations of our findings.  Therefore, we also collect annual option grants from the 
annual reports and estimate the value of these options using the Black-Scholes option 
pricing formula (Black and Scholes, 1973).  In robustness tests, we then compute log 
changes in total cash and option compensation and average cash and option 
compensation and estimate pay-performance sensitivity using these measures as well.5  
                                                 
3 Unlike Jensen and Murphy (1990), we only include newly granted executive stock options.  Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999) posit that only newly granted options should be included in measuring the pay-
performance sensitivity because stock options are sensitive to firm performance when each option is 
granted.  Therefore, we also exclude the realized value of exercised options. 
4 We calculated this using Execucomp, which reports compensation for all S&P 1500 firms, both active and 
inactive.  
5 In order to avoid confusion, we will use the term “total” to refer to compensation paid to all executives, 
directors, and auditors and the term “average” to refer to the average of the total compensation.  We will 
use the term “cash compensation” to refer to salary and bonus compensation and the term “cash and 
option compensation” to refer to salary, bonus and option pay.  Therefore, we will have total cash 
compensation and total cash and option compensation as well as average cash compensation and average 
cash and option compensation.  
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On average, total cash compensation is 1,750 million Korean won, around 1.6 million 
U.S. dollars, and average cash compensation is 195 million Korean won, around 180,000 
U.S. dollars.6  This compares to an average cash compensation in the U.S. of $1.9 million 
and average total compensation of $5.7 million.7 
 In order to compute pay-performance sensitivity, we also need a performance 
measure.  Jensen and Murphy (1990) use the log change in market value as an 
independent variable.  However, market value is highly correlated with the size of the 
firm.  In order to avoid the size effect, Kaplan (1994) uses stock returns as a performance 
measure.  In this study, we use both variables for the performance measure.  Also, we use 
logarithmic returns instead of arithmetic returns because arithmetic returns are too 
asymmetrically distributed.  Combining two dependent and two independent variables, 
we have four models to estimate pay-performance sensitivity. 
 Because we are examining the relation between change in compensation and 
change in performance, the timing of the performance changes may be critical.  The 
problem of using contemporaneous performance is that the performance occurs after 
decisions are made for compensation changes.  In particular, previous performance may 
be more important for salary changes than contemporaneous performance since changes 
in cash compensation are often determined by performance in the previous year.  
However, decisions regarding the payout of a bonus may be determined by the 
performance in the present year if the bonus is paid at the end of fiscal year.  Also, if a 
company pays a bonus in the beginning of the fiscal year based on the previous year’s 
                                                 
6 We calculate using the exchange rate, $1 = 1,100 Korean won.  
7 These figures represent data for all Execucomp firms from 2004 through 2006 (Cai and Walkling, 2009).   
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performance, lagged performance could affect the bonus decision.  Due to this ambiguity, 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) use both contemporaneous and lagged performance variables 
to measure pay-performance sensitivity.  Most Korean companies pay bonuses at the 
beginning of the year based on the performance of the previous year.  Therefore, lagged 
performance may be more important in determining cash compensation.  However, in 
some cases, companies pay bonuses at the end of the fiscal year based on 
contemporaneous performance.  Therefore, both contemporaneous and prior performance 
should be included to analyze pay-performance sensitivity in Korean firms. 
 
3.3. Econometric model 
 
 We use ∆ln(TPAY) (log changes in total compensation) and ∆ln(APAY) (log 
changes in average compensation) as the dependent variables8 and ∆ln(MV) (log changes 
in market value) and return (log changes in stock prices) as the independent variables.  
Therefore, we have four models to measure pay-performance sensitivity. 
 
Model I: ∆ln(TPAY)it = β0 + β1∆ln(MV) it + εit      (1) 
Model II: ∆ln(TPAY) it = β0 + β1Returnit + εit                       (2) 
Model III: ∆ln(APAY) it = β0 + β1∆ln(MV) it + εit                (3) 
Model IV: ∆ln(APAY) it = β0 + β1Returnit + εit     (4) 
 
                                                 
8 In the main results, we use log changes in total cash compensation and log changes in average cash 
compensation.  In robustness test, we use log changes in total cash and option compensation and log 
changes in average cash and option compensation. 
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 For each of the models above, we utilize four different specifications as outlined 
below.  In specifications (a) and (b), we use contemporaneous and lagged variables, 
respectively.  Also, we have a third specification, (c) with both performance variables 
together and a fourth specification, (d) with both performance variables and additional 
control variables.  Therefore, in total, we have 16 regressions in this study.  The four 
specifications (for each of the models listed above) are:  
 
 
1) ∆ln(PAY) it = β0 + β1Performanceit + εit                                (a) 
2) ∆ln(PAY) it = β0 + β1Performance it-1+ εit                             (b) 
3) ∆ln(PAY) it = β0 + β1Performanceit + β2Performance i,t-1+ εit                             (c) 
4) ∆ln(PAY) it = β0 + β1Performanceit + β2Performance i,t-1+ βj(control variables) it + εit           
                                                                (d)9 
 Performance is measured either as ∆ln(MV) or Return, as outlined in Models I-IV 
above.  In specification (d), we include several control variables.  We use the change in 
ROA and log change in sales as operating measures. Since we find that the dependent 
variables are highly autocorrelated with its first lagged term, we use autoregressive order 
one in the multivariate regressions.  We also add the change in the number of all directors, 
executives, and auditors, ∆NUMDIR, when the dependent variable is ∆ln(TPAY)it 
because this change is certainly correlated with the change in total compensation.  Finally, 
                                                 
9 Among the 16 regression models, we only show 4 multivariate models in the tables.  Although we do not 
show all of our univariate tests, those results are highly consistent with the multivariate tests and do not 
change the implications of our study. 
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we include 31 industry dummy variables as defined by 3-digit Korean SIC codes (KSIC) 
announced by the Korea National Statistical Office.  Since the residuals can be cross-
sectionally correlated, we cluster the standard errors by firm for our all regression models. 
 In the analysis of panel data, significant firm and year fixed effects often arise.  
One way to control for firm fixed effects is to use first-differences rather than using year 
dummy variables.  Because we use the first-difference variables, potential firm-fixed 
effects may be eliminated.  Previous studies on pay-performance sensitivity which use 
panel data also utilize the first difference variables to avoid the firm fixed effect (Kato 
and Kubo, 2006; Kato et al., 2007).  We also have a potential endogeneity issue.  If 
foreign investors prefer firms with good corporate governance, high pay-performance 
sensitivity may be present, but not as a result of the monitoring ability of foreign 
investors.  Rather, the sensitivity may exist simply because of the preference of foreign 
investors for firms that are well-governed (Leuz et al., 2009).  In order to control for the 
endogeneity issue, we perform several tests.  First, we split the sample by the previous 
year’s data.  For example, when we split the sample by the median of foreign shares in 
2006, we use the data at the end of 2005, not 2006.  Therefore, the decision for 2006 
compensation may be influenced by the ownership structure in 2005, rather than the 
ownership in 2006, which certainly cannot affect the current (2006) compensation 
decision.  Second, we incorporate a Heckman analysis to control for this selectivity issue 
of foreign investors.  Following Kang and Stulz (1997), we estimate the probability of 
high (or low) investment by foreign shareholders with the use of a probit analysis in the 
first stage:  
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Probability of High (Low) Foreign sharesit = β0 + β1Performancei,t-1 + β2CG Indexit + 
β3Debt-to-Equity Ratioi,t-1 + β4ln(Market Value)i,t-1 + β5Book-to-Market Ratioi,t-1 + 
βjtIndustry Dummiesj,t  + εit        (5)  
 
Performance is measured by stock returns from the previous period, and CG 
(Corporate Governance) Index is measured as a dummy variable which takes the value of 
one if the firm is included in the list of firms with good or best corporate governance 
from the Governance Assessment Grade, as measured by KCGS (Korea Corporate 
Governance Service) and zero otherwise.  We then compute the inverse mills ratio from 
two separate probit regressions, one estimating the probability of high foreign investment 
and one estimating the probability of low foreign investment.  We then include the 
inverse mills ratio from the first stage probit as a control variable in our second stage tests.  
Our second stage specifications are Models I through IV above.  We perform these and 
other tests to correct for endogeneity which are outlined in detail in section 5.3.   
 
3.4. Sample description 
 
 Table 1 presents a description of the full sample which entails 656 observations.  
On average, foreign investors own 21% of the firms, and blockholders own 6% of the 
firm.  Because more than half of the firms in our sample do not have foreign blockholder 
ownership, the median of foreign block ownership is zero.  The annual logarithmic return 
for the full sample, on average, is around 28%, which appears to be extremely high.  
However, during this sample period, the Korean stock market performed very well, and 
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the annual logarithmic returns during the sample period for KOSPI 200 index was around 
21%.  Because of the strong market returns, the log change in market value is also high, 
about 34%. 
 Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics by foreign shares and reveals that foreign 
investors are more likely to invest in larger firms, consistent with Dahlquist and 
Robertsson (2001) and Aggarwal et al (2010).  We split the sample based on the median 
percent of foreign shares at the end of the previous year.  The statistics show that high 
foreign share firms are larger and experience lower returns.  This finding is consistent 
with the “size premium” of Fama-French (1993), which shows that smaller firms report 
higher returns than their large capitalization counterparts.  The level of compensation is 
greater in the firms with higher foreign shares, which may be related to size.  Since both 
market value and sales level are greater in high foreign share firms, their size is larger 
than the firms with lower foreign shares.  In unreported results, we also examine the 
descriptive statistics by the quartiles of foreign shares.  These findings show a similar 
pattern as seen in Table 2.  Performance is strongest in the first quartile, while 
compensation level is greater in the fourth quartile.  In addition, size measures such as 
market value and sales level are greatest in the firms with the highest level of foreign 
shares. 
 We also examine our descriptive statistics for non-chaebol and chaebol firms.  
We define chaebol firms as family-owned conglomerates that were included in the list of 
the 30 largest conglomerates announced by Korean Fair Trade Committee.  Since this list 
is generated each year, a firm could be defined as chaebol in one year and differently in 
another year.  We control for this annual definition of chaebol.  Therefore, if a firm is a 
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member of a chaebol conglomerate, we call it a chaebol firm.  In unreported results, we 
test differences between chaebol and non-chaebol firms.  Interestingly, while the average 
and median of the foreign shares in chaebol firms are statistically significantly higher 
than that in non-chaebol firms, the foreign block ownership in chaebol firms is lower.  
The size measures, including market value and sales, are greater in chaebol firms, which 
is not surprising since chaebol is defined by size.  Therefore, the chaebol firms may have 
more foreign shares simply because foreign investors are attracted to larger firms as 
found in previous studies (Kang and Stulz, 1997; Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; 
Aggarwal et al., 2005).  Foreign investors may tend to invest in larger and better known 
firms such as Samsung and LG, both chaebol firms.  As a result, we control for size in 
our subsequent tests.   
In other unreported results, we examine the summary statistics by the existence of 
foreign block shareholders.  Korean regulation requires companies to identify the 
blockholders that own more than 5% of the shares; these blockholders appear in the 
annual reports.  The number of firm-year observations with foreign block shareholders is 
224, which is less than half of the sample.10  This is also consistent with the fact that the 
median of foreign block ownership for the full sample is zero.  Also, firms with foreign 
blockholders are larger and have lower returns, consistent with our findings when we 
split the sample by foreign shares, as shown in Table 2 
                                                 
10 The number of unique firms in our sample with foreign blockholders is 89 (out of 164).  
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4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Full sample results 
 
 We report results using cash compensation in Tables 3 through 12.  Since 91% 
of our firm-year observations are those with only cash compensation, we believe that 
pay-performance sensitivity using cash compensation is more representative of Korean 
firms.  However, for robustness we perform the same tests for cash and option 
compensation.11  Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of Models I through IV for 
the full sample (all 656 firms).  When we use market value changes for the performance 
measure (Models I and III), we find that the change in compensation is significantly 
sensitive to contemporaneous performance for the firms in the sample.  In addition, when 
we use returns for the performance measure (Models II and IV), we find that 
compensation changes are sensitive to both contemporaneous and lagged performances.  
The result is consistent with the extant literature; Kato et al. (2007) find that there is pay-
performance sensitivity in Korea using returns as the performance measure.  Therefore, 
based on the full sample results we find evidence of pay-performance sensitivity in Korea.  
We now examine the sample segregated by chaebol versus non-chaebol firms and 
segregated by high and low foreign ownership.   
 
                                                 
11 We report the results for the total sample in Table 13 and those for the sample split by foreign shares in 
Table 14.  The results of other tests are unreported and available upon request. 
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4.2. Empirical results split by chaebol 
 
 Table 4 reports the results of estimating Models I through IV for non-chaebol and 
chaebol firms in the sample.  We find little evidence of the existence of pay-performance 
sensitivity in non-chaebol firms, which is not consistent with Kato et al. (2007).  
Moreover, we can see that compensation is significantly sensitive to the some 
performance measures in chaebol firms.   
One of the most important differences between Kato et al. (2007) and this study 
is the time period examined.  As we discussed previously, chaebol companies have made 
efforts to improve their governance system since the financial crisis in 1997.  Kato et al. 
(2007) examine firms from 1998 to 2001.  Therefore, as mentioned previously, the 
overall effectiveness of chaebol reforms may not have fully been realized in their study.  
Since our sample period is from 2003 to 2006, and we find evidence of pay-performance 
sensitivity in chaebol firms, this may provide some support that chaebol reforms have 
been somewhat successful.   
 
4.3. Empirical result split by the level of foreign shares 
 
 One of these other factors that may be associated with good governance is the 
level of foreign shareholders, particularly since Korea encouraged firms to attract foreign 
investors.  Indeed, we believe our contribution to the extant literature is the examination 
of the impact of foreign shareholders on pay-performance sensitivity.  Table 5 reports the 
results of the estimation of Models I though IV segregated by the level of foreign share 
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ownership.  We divide the sample into high and low foreign share firms, split by the 
median level of foreign share ownership in the previous year.  Consistently in all models, 
we find that pay-performance sensitivity is only significant in those firms with high 
foreign share ownership.  In Model III and IV, only firms with high foreign share 
ownership display compensation changes that are sensitive to the change in ROA.  
Because we may lose important information using the median to divide the sample (Table 
5), we split the sample into four groups using the quartiles of foreign share ownership 
from the previous year.  Table 6 reports the results of the estimation of Models I through 
IV segregated by the quartile of foreign shares.  The coefficients of contemporaneous 
performance measures in the fourth quartile are significant, suggesting pay-performance 
sensitivity exists in the highest foreign share firms.  In the third quartile, the lagged 
performance measures are significantly related to change in compensation.  Firms in the 
second quartile have no evidence that their compensation changes are determined by the 
performance, but there is weak evidence of pay-performance sensitivity in the lowest 
quartile of foreign share ownership (Model I).  Although significance is only found in 
Model I, there may be some other factors such as a strong internal monitoring that make 
these lower foreign share firms’ pay-performance sensitivity slightly significant.  Overall, 
we interpret the findings in Tables 5 and 6 as evidence that strong pay-performance 
sensitivity is present in firms with high levels of foreign share ownership.   
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4.4. Empirical result split by the existence of foreign block shareholders 
 
 In order to test the second hypothesis, that pay-performance sensitivity is related 
to the level of foreign blockholders, we divide the sample into two groups by the 
existence of these shareholders.  Foreign blockholders are defined as foreign shareholders 
that have more than 5% of the shares.  Because Korean securities regulations require 
firms to report all shareholders who own more than 5%, we are able to collect the foreign 
blockholder ownership data from the annual report.  Table 7 reports the result of the 
regression tests, and the evidence appears somewhat mixed.  For firms without foreign 
blockholders, some performance measures are related to changes in compensation, while 
only accounting performance is related to changes in compensation for firms with foreign 
blockholders.  Therefore, we do not find initial evidence that foreign blockholders 
improve corporate governance in Korea, which is not consistent with our hypothesis. 
 In fact, this test has some limitations due to data availability.  First, we can only 
identify those foreign shareholders who own more than 5% of the shares.  However, there 
are many foreign institutional shareholders who own less than 5%, and it is unclear if 
only shareholders with more than 5% have an interest in maximizing the firm value 
and/or improving corporate governance.  If we could identify each foreign shareholder, 
we might have stronger results.  However, as we addressed in the data section, only 
blockholders are reported in Korean annual reports. 
 The second problem is also related to the identity of the foreign blockholders.  
Some of them are, in fact, managers of companies.12  Hence, their interests are not 
                                                 
12 For example, in 2005, Ssangyong Motors, a firm in our sample, was sold to Shanghai Motors, a Chinese 
automobile company.  Although Ssangyong Motors has its operation in Korea, its CEO was sent by 
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separate from managers’ interests, suggesting that these shareholders may not be 
monitors. 13   Therefore, we would not find support of our second hypothesis which 
follows a monitoring story.  Cho and Sul (2006) find that the presence of foreign 
blockholders is not related to an increase in R&D investment and is negatively associated 
with fixed investment, implying that blockholders are not responsible for increases in 
firm value in Korea.  Moreover, while Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that 
blockholders monitor managers, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that very large 
blockholders may expropriate benefits from minority shareholders.  Indeed, Thomsen et 
al. (2006) find that blockholders have a negative effect on the value of firms in 
Continental Europe at high levels of ownership and an insignificant effect for low levels, 
consistent with Bebchuk and Roe (1999) who posit that blockholder ownership is path-
dependent and does not necessarily adjust to value-maximizing levels.   
 In order to see the effect of foreign blockholders in more detail, we build four 
portfolios using the existence of foreign blockholders and the level of foreign shares 
(high/low).  When firms have a high level of foreign shares, we find evidence of pay-
performance sensitivity regardless of the existence of a blockholder.  Even when foreign 
blockholders are non-existent, pay-performance sensitivity is present in the firms with 
high level of foreign shares, and absent for those with low level of foreign shares.  
Therefore, some foreign shareholders, even those owning less than 5%, can play a 
monitoring role in the companies with high level of foreign shares. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Shanghai Motors.  Therefore, even though Shanghai Motors is a foreign blockholder of Ssangyong 
Motors, it cannot be a monitor of the company because it also manages the firm. 
13 Korean regulations also require block shareholders to report the purpose of their holdings.  However, 
because this specific regulation was implemented after 2005, we cannot use these filings for this study.   
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 Given the possibility of non-linear effects with blockholders, we also examine 
only the firms with foreign blockholders (n =224).  We split this subsample further into 
three groups by the level of foreign block ownership: less than 10%, between 10% and 
30%, and greater than 30%.  In unreported results, we find that firms with ownership 
levels between 10% and 30% exhibit significant pay-performance sensitivity in all 
models.  However, for those with ownership greater than 30%, pay-performance 
sensitivity is absent consistent with Bebchuk and Roe (1999).  Also, for those firms with 
foreign block ownership less than 10%, we find significant pay-performance sensitivity 
only in Model II.  These findings are consistent with our expectation that some foreign 
blockholders are not interested in monitoring the firm.  Those who own greater than 30% 
are more interested in managing the firm, not monitoring the firm as Fama and Jensen 
(1983) and Burkart et al. (1997) suggest.  Those who own less than 10% may not have 
enough power to improve governance, especially if the firm has a low level of foreign 
shares.  These findings also suggest that an optimal level of blockholder ownership may 
be necessary for monitoring as found in non-linear relationship between firm value and 
managerial ownership (Morock et al. 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Davies et al., 
2005).   
 5. Robustness tests 
 
5.1. The role of foreign shareholders under various conditions 
 
 Because the role of foreign shareholders as effective monitors may be different in 
various situations, we create four portfolios using a chaebol dummy and a dummy for 
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high foreign shares.  Table 8 shows the results for those regressions, and we find that 
pay-performance sensitivities are most significant in chaebol firms with high foreign 
shares.  We also find that pay-performance sensitivity exists only in firms with high 
foreign shares, but never in those with low foreign shares.  Therefore, we can conclude 
that foreign shareholders are more instrumental in impacting good governance, especially 
in chaebol firms. 
 We also build four portfolios using both family shares and foreign shares because 
family shares may measure the effect of ownership structure more directly.  Family 
shares are calculated by the special-related shares in Korean annual reports including 
shares of all family members, any insiders, and shares of firms in the same conglomerate 
controlled by the family. As shown in Table 9, if a firm is included in the high foreign 
shares and low family share group, it has the most significant pay-performance sensitivity.  
Although the results show some significant pay-performance sensitivity in the low 
foreign and high family share group, a more accurate calculation of family shares may 
provide different results since Korean firms have very complicated ownership 
structures.14   Our findings suggest that foreign share ownership is most effective at 
influencing pay-performance sensitivity when family control is low.   
 
5.2. Size effect 
 
 As we have already addressed, foreigners tend to invest in larger firms.  Therefore, 
size may also matter in this study.  In the U.S., a size effect may be critical in measuring 
                                                 
14 Almeida et al. (2008) have estimated family shares by the sum of direct votes held by the family, and all 
the indirect votes held by other firms that belong to the conglomerate.     
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pay-performance sensitivity (Cichello, 2005).  Moreover, if size is more important, 
chaebol may not be an important factor for foreigners in their investment decision.  In 
unreported regressions, we test the pay-performance sensitivity for the samples split by 
size, as defined by asset level.  We find that larger firms are more likely to have pay-
performance sensitivities than smaller firms.  We also create four portfolios using size 
and foreign shares and find that firms with high levels of foreign shares exhibit pay-
performance sensitivity even though they are larger firms.15   
 
5.3. Endogeneity tests  
 
We understand that our results have a potential endogeneity issue.  In this section, 
we outline our tests to correct for this possible limitation.  
 
5.3.1. Selection bias 
 
 Foreign shareholders may simply invest in firms with good corporate governance 
(Leuz et al., 2009).  Therefore, using the inverse mills ratio from equation 5, we re-
estimate our tests.  We next estimate the following equation:  
 
                                                 
15 In unreported results, we find significant sensitivity in small firms, but only in high foreign share firms 
in Model II.   
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∆ln(PAY)it = β0 + β1Performanceit + β2Performance i,t-1 + β3λ(j) + βj(control variable)jt 
+ εit                      (6) 
 
where λ(j) represents the inverse mills ratio from estimating equation 9 for high (low) 
foreign investment.  Other variables are defined as before.  Table 10 shows these results.  
The lambda coefficients are insignificant in the regression, and after controlling for this 
selection bias, the high foreign share firms are those that have a significant pay-
performance relation.  We conclude that even after controlling for the possibility that 
foreign shareholders may only invest in good corporate governance firms, we still find 
evidence that foreign shareholders are able to monitor the firms.  Relative to their low 
foreign share investors, high foreign shareholders are associated with significant pay-
performance sensitivity.  
 
5.3.2. Varying levels of corporate governance 
 
As a further robustness check, we test our results across different levels of 
corporate governance.  We separate the sample into “Good Corporate Governance” firms 
and those that are “Moderate/Bad Corporate Governance” as graded by the KCGS 
(Korean Corporate Governance Service).  Our results are in Table 11.  As shown in 
previous results, it is the high foreign owned firms that display pay-performance 
sensitivity for both categories of governance.  We interpret these findings as indication 
that high foreign ownership is critical to pay-performance sensitivity regardless of the 
“grade” of the corporate governance system.  Given the findings in Table 10, we can also 
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interpret these findings that foreign shareholders may improve governance rather than 
just choosing good governance firms.  
 
5.3.3. Changes in pay-performance sensitivity and changes in foreign ownership 
 
 As Hartzell and Starks (2003) indicate, if investors (in our case, foreign investors) 
can influence compensation, we expect that when ownership increases, so too will pay-
performance sensitivity.  Following Hartzell and Starks (2003), we calculate the change 
in foreign ownership in the early part of our sample, from 2001 to 2003.  Then using a 
similar procedure as in Hartzell and Starks (2003), we estimate the average pay-
performance sensitivities from the latter part of the sample (2003 to 2006) and from the 
early part of the sample (2001 to 2003) by computing the compensation changes divided 
by the performance measures.  Then, we compute the difference between two averages to 
obtain the long-run pay-performance sensitivity.  Lastly, we regress the long-run pay-
performance sensitivity on changes in foreign ownership from the early period.  As 
shown in Table 12, when we use total compensation (TPAY) and market value to 
compute pay-performance sensitivity (Model I), we find a strong positive relation 
between the long-run change in pay-performance sensitivity and the early changes in 
foreign ownership.  When we estimate the opposite regression (long-run changes in 
foreign ownership on early changes in pay-performance sensitivity), we find no 
significant relation.  These findings provide further evidence suggesting that foreign 
investors influence pay-performance sensitivity and may be able to improve corporate 
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governance in spite of any possible selection bias arising from foreign investors investing 
in firms with established good governance.   
 
5.4. Empirical results for pay-performance sensitivity for cash and option compensation 
 
 As mentioned previously, only 19% of Korean firms ever utilize option 
compensation, and overall, only around 8% of our firm-year observations include option 
compensation.  In addition, in our sample, only 3 firms utilize option compensation every 
year.  This stands in stark contrast to the U.S, where the vast majority of firms (87%) 
extend option grants every year.  Despite the lack of widespread use of option 
compensation in Korean firms, in an effort to be thorough, we mimic the tests exhibited 
in Tables 3 - 12 using pay-performance sensitivity for the sum of cash and option 
compensation.   
 In unreported tests, we find for the full sample (analogous to Table 3) that Korean 
firms exhibit pay-performance sensitivity for cash and option compensation, and we find 
that chaebol firms exhibit more sensitivity for all compensation than do their non-chaebol 
counterparts (analogous to Table 4).   However, when we split the sample by high foreign 
shares, we find that firms with low foreign shares also have pay-performance sensitivity 
using contemporaneous performance (see Table 13). As shown in Table 5 when we 
examine changes in cash compensation, high foreign share firms exhibit pay-performance 
sensitivity, while low foreign share firms do not.  The difference in the results from Table 
5 and those in Table 13 is driven by the fact that low foreign share firms demonstrate 
pay-performance sensitivity for the observations where option compensation is included.  
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Since only 8% of firms in our sample grant options, we examine just these firms (55 
firm-year observations) and segregate them into high/low family share ownership.   
 We find, in unreported results, that high family share firms that issue options 
exhibit pay-performance sensitivity.  This is not surprising upon examination of the 
results in Table 14 of pay-performance sensitivity of cash and option compensation (for 
the full sample), segregated by family and foreign shares.  Examination of Table 14, we 
find that firms with high foreign and low family share firms still have pay-performance 
sensitivity similar to the results using cash compensation.  However, we also find that the 
firms with low foreign but high family shares also have pay-performance sensitivity for 
cash and option compensation in all models.  When we examine only cash compensation, 
low foreign and high family share firms exhibit pay-performance sensitivity only in 
Model I.  Perhaps family ownership plays a role in increasing pay-performance 
sensitivity by granting options in low foreign firms.  Since our compensation data 
includes pay for not only the CEO but also other executives, directors, and auditors, a 
family CEO may be also interested in pay-performance sensitivity, not just for himself 
but also for others. 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
 
 We investigate the relation between the level of foreign shares and pay-
performance sensitivity in a sample of Korean firms to determine if foreign investors are 
beneficial in improving corporate governance.  Focusing on changes in cash 
compensation since most Korean firms only pay cash, we find evidence that firms with 
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higher foreign shares have more significant pay-performance sensitivity, implying that 
foreigners may be beneficial.  Unlike previous studies, chaebol is not the most important 
factor in the determination of corporate governance effectiveness.  Further, even when we 
control for the probability of investment in good corporate governance firms, our results 
are unchanged.  Moreover, we find some evidence that changes in foreign ownership are 
associated with long-run changes in pay-performance sensitivity but not the other way 
around.  We interpret these findings that chaebol reforms after the financial crisis in 1997 
are somewhat successful, and foreign investment is one of the key factors to enhance the 
governance system.   
 We find a non-linear impact of foreign blockholders on pay-performance 
sensitivity, suggesting there may be an optimal level of blockholder ownership.  
Blockholders owning between 10% and 30% of the shares are associated with significant 
pay-performance sensitivity, while those owning greater than 30% are more interested in 
managing the firm, not monitoring the firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Blockholders with 
less than 10% ownership are also not able to improve governance, particularly in firms 
with low overall foreign ownership.   
Our results are indicative that firms in emerging markets can benefit from foreign 
investors.  Our paper contributes to the debate about governance mechanisms in 
emerging markets.  In particular, we find that the agency problems inherent in managerial 
compensation structures can be mitigated by high levels of foreign investors. 
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Fig. 1. Proportion of foreign shares in Korean stock market: The source of the graph is Korean Financial 
Supervisory Service, Monthly Financial Statistics Bulletin 
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Fig. 2. Market value of stocks acquired by foreigners: The source of the graph is Korean Financial 
Supervisory Service, Monthly Financial Statistics Bulletin. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Maximum Median Minimum 
Foreign 656 21.12% 19.61% 92.97% 17.17% 0.00% 
Foreign Block 656 5.83% 12.02% 77.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Cash TPAY 
(millions) 656 1,750 3,691 54,300 1,029 133 
Δln(Cash TPAY) 656 10.68% 36.18% 228.32% 9.85% -149.10% 
Cash APAY 
(millions) 656 195 292 4,177 122 12 
Δln(Cash APAY) 656 11.17% 35.65% 150.60% 9.89% -130.56% 
Cash/Option 
TPAY (millions) 656 1,936 4,446 62,962 1,062 133 
Δln(Cash/Option 
TPAY) 656 10.03% 44.71% 228.32% 9.16% -392.26% 
Cash/Option 
APAY (millions) 656 211 343 4,497 128 12 
Δln(Cash/Option 
APAY) 656 10.52% 42.59% 177.11% 8.95% -336.14% 
OPTION 656 0.08 0.28 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MV (millions) 656 1,689,804 6,136,188 97,070,220 336,539 467 
Δln(MV) 656 33.91% 58.31% 507.25% 28.22% -337.29% 
Return 656 27.68% 49.06% 365.67% 24.82% -181.29% 
ROA 656 4.82% 8.03% 36.41% 5.34% -69.58% 
SALES (billions) 656 2,443 5,371 57,632 782 7 
Δln(SALES) 656 7.12% 24.07% 196.23% 6.04% -140.75% 
 
The table reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample of 164 KOPSI 200 firms from 2003 to 2006.  
Foreign is the proportion of foreign shares.  Foreign Block is the sum of foreign shares owned by foreign 
blockholders, the shareholders who have more than five percents of the common shares.  TPAY is the total 
compensation for all executives, auditors, and directors.  ∆ln(TPAY) is calculated by ln(TPAY)t – ln(TPAY)t-
1.  APAY is the average compensation calculated by TPAY/number of all executives, auditors, and directors.  
∆ln(APAY) is calculated by ln(APAY)t – ln(APAY)t-1.  OPTION takes the value 1 if option grants exist; 
otherwise it is 0.  MV is the market value of the firm and ∆ln(MV) is calculated by ln(MV)t – ln(MV)t-1.  
Return is calculated by ln(Price)t – ln(Price)t-1. SALES is the revenue of the firm and ∆ln(SALES) is 
calculated by ln(SALES)t – ln(SALES)t-1.  
35 
 
 
Table 2  
Descriptive statistics by foreign shares 
 
Variable 
Low Foreign Share (N = 328) High Foreign Share (N = 328) 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Foreign 5.57% 3.29% 36.67%*** 34.06%*** 
Foreign Block 0.95% 0.00% 10.70%*** 5.98%*** 
Cash TPAY (millions) 1,040 754 2,459*** 1,402*** 
Δln(Cash TPAY) 12.32% 10.03% 9.03% 8.97% 
Cash APAY (millions) 124 102 265*** 159*** 
Δln(Cash APAY) 14.00% 11.08% 8.34%** 8.84% 
Cash/Option TPAY 
(millions) 1,098 784 2,773*** 1,434*** 
Δln(Cash/Option 
TPAY) 11.92% 9.96% 8.14% 8.55% 
Cash/Option APAY 
(millions) 130 104 291*** 163*** 
Δln(Cash/Option 
APAY) 13.60% 10.13% 7.45%* 7.66%* 
OPTION  0.08 0 0.09 0 
MV (millions) 471,371 144,305 2,908,237*** 852,168*** 
Δln(MV) 44.32% 33.72% 23.50%*** 20.34%*** 
Return 34.20% 31.03% 21.16%*** 19.43%*** 
ROA 2.87% 3.79% 6.77%*** 6.41%*** 
SALES (millions) 1,206 403 3,680*** 1,178*** 
Δln(SALES) 8.08% 6.53% 6.15% 5.77% 
 
The table reports the descriptive statistics by the foreign shares.  Low/High Foreign is determined by the 
median of the foreign share at the previous year. Foreign is the proportion of foreign shares.   Foreign 
Block is the sum of foreign shares owned by foreign blockholders.  TPAY is the total compensations for all 
executives, auditors, and directors.  ∆ln(TPAY) is calculated by ln(TPAY)t – ln(TPAY)t-1.  APAY is the 
average compensation calculated by TPAY/number of all executives, auditors, and directors.  ∆ln(APAY) is 
calculated by ln(APAY)t – ln(APAY)t-1.  OPTION takes the value 1 if option grants exist; otherwise it is 0.  
MV is the market value of the firm and ∆ln(MV) is calculated by ln(MV)t – ln(MV)t-1.  Return is calculated 
by ln(Price)t – ln(Price)t-1. SALES is the revenue of the firm and ∆ln(SALES) is calculated by ln(SALES)t – 
ln(SALES)t-1.  We test the equal mean and median using t and wilcoxon statistics.  ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.   
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Table 3  
Pay-performance sensitivity of cash compensation for the full sample 
 
Model I II III IV 
N 656  656  656  656  
R2 0.21  0.21  0.15  0.16  
Intercept 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.32*** 0.32*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Performancet 
0.08*** 0.07** 0.05* 0.08** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) 
Performancet-1 
0.03 0.06* 0.04 0.06* 
(0.35) (0.06) (0.17) (0.09) 
ΔROAt -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 (0.81) (0.92) (0.86) (0.83) 
Δln(SALES)t 0.15** 0.16** 0.13* 0.13* (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.08) 
 COMPENSATIONt-1 
-0.24*** -0.25*** -0.31*** -0.32*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ΔNUMDIRt 0.05*** 0.05*** (0.00) (0.00)     
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests for the full sample (see the Table 1).  The dependent 
variable of Models I and II is the log change of total cash compensation, and the dependent variable of 
Models III and IV is the log change of average cash compensation.  Performancet in Models I and III is log 
change in market values between t-1 and t, and Performancet in Models II and IV is stock return, which is 
calculated by ln(Price)t – ln(Price)t-1. ∆ROAt is the change of the returns on assets.  ∆ln(Sales )t  is 
calculated by ln(Sales)t – ln(Sales)t-1.   COMPENSATIONt-1 is the first lagged variable of each dependent 
variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in the number of all directors, executives, and auditors.  ***, **, and * 
denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 4  
Pay-performance sensitivity of cash compensation by chaebol 
 
 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests for Chaebol companies from 2003 to 2006.  The 
dependent variable of Models I and II is the log change of total cash compensation, and the dependent 
variable of Models III and IV is the log change of average cash compensation.  Performancet in Models I 
and III is log change in market values between t-1 and t, and Performancet in Models II and IV is stock 
return, which is calculated by ln(Price)t – ln(Price)t-1.  ∆ROAt is the change of the returns on assets.  
∆ln(Sales )t  is calculated by ln(Sales)t – ln(Sales)t-1.   COMPENSATIONt-1 is the first lagged variable of 
each dependent variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in the number of all directors, executives, and auditors.  
***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 405 405 405 405 251 251 251 251
R2 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.22
-0.02** -0.02** -0.05*** -0.05*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.25*** 0.27***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.06* 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.13** 0.14**
(0.08) (0.20) (0.68) (0.26) (0.11) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03)
0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.09
(0.26) (0.14) (0.35) (0.40) (0.84) (0.49) (0.40) (0.24)
-0.23 -0.19 -0.21 -0.22 0.74* 0.81* 0.92** 1.01**
(0.24) (0.34) (0.22) (0.20) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
0.18** 0.21** 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.13
(0.05) (0.03) (0.10) (0.13) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.17)
-0.28*** -0.28*** -0.38*** -0.39*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.31*** -0.32***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Δln(SALES)t
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
Performancet
Performancet-1
ΔROAt
Non-chaebol Chaebol
intercept
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Table 5  
Pay-performance sensitivity of cash compensation by foreign shares 
 
 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests by the Foreign shares (see Table 2).  Low/High Foreign 
is determined by the median of the foreign share at the previous year.  The dependent variable of Models I 
and II is the log change of total cash compensation, and the dependent variable of Models III and IV is the 
log change of average cash compensation.  Performancet in Models I and III is log change in market values 
between t-1 and t, and Performancet in Models II and IV is stock return, which is calculated by ln(Price)t – 
ln(Price)t-1.  ∆ROAt is the change of the returns on assets.  ∆ln(Sales )t  is calculated by ln(Sales)t – 
ln(Sales)t-1.   COMPENSATIONt-1 is the first lagged variable of each dependent variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is 
the change in the number of all directors, executives, and auditors.  ***, **, and * denote the significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
Foreign Share
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 328 328 328 328 328 328 328 328
R2 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.30 0.29 0.21 0.22
0.50*** 0.46*** 0.53*** 0.51*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.30*** 0.28***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.05 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.12** 0.09* 0.10** 0.11**
(0.16) (0.20) (0.57) (0.19) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.17***
(1.00) (0.54) (0.48) (0.50) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
-0.11 -0.07 -0.13 -0.15 0.66 0.55 1.07* 0.89*
(0.58) (0.71) (0.51) (0.44) (0.13) (0.22) (0.05) (0.10)
0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.07 0.14 -0.03 0.04
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.35) (0.15) (0.76) (0.72)
-0.24*** -0.24*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.31***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Low High
intercept
Performancet
Performancet-1
ΔROAt
Δln(SALES)t
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
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Table 6  
Pay-performance sensitivity of cash compensation by quartile of foreign shares  
 
 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests by the quartile of Foreign shares. Quartile of the foreign 
shares is determined by the foreign share at the previous year.  The dependent variable of Models I and II is 
the log change of total cash compensation, and the dependent variable of Models III and IV is the log 
change of average cash compensation.  Performancet in Models I and III is log change in market values 
between t-1 and t, and Performancet in Models II and IV is stock return, which is calculated by ln(Price)t – 
ln(Price)t-1.   ∆ROAt is the change of the returns on assets.  ∆ln(Sales )t  is calculated by ln(Sales)t – 
ln(Sales)t-1.   COMPENSATIONt-1 is the first lagged variable of each dependent variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is 
the change in the number of all directors, executives, and auditors.  ***, **, and * denote the significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
Quartile
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
R2 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.36 0.36 0.29 0.29
-0.17*** -0.16** -0.17*** -0.21** 0.25 0.30 0.25 0.29*
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.27) (0.24) (0.11) (0.08)
0.07* 0.08 0.04 0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03
(0.08) (0.12) (0.40) (0.22) (0.44) (0.55) (0.51) (0.75)
0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.03
(0.68) (0.21) (0.29) (0.20) (0.86) (0.71) (0.66) (0.74)
-0.35 -0.29 -0.38* -0.38 1.47* 1.42* 1.35* 1.19
(0.22) (0.28) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.11)
0.10 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.21 0.23 0.25* 0.28**
(0.48) (0.44) (0.43) (0.49) (0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.04)
-0.27** -0.29*** -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.25** -0.23** -0.35*** -0.34***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
0.06** 0.06** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
Quartile
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
R2 0.35 0.37 0.30 0.33 0.40 0.38 0.27 0.27
0.33*** 0.30*** 0.20** 0.15* 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.59) (0.94) (0.36) (0.97)
0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.17** 0.16** 0.16*** 0.18**
(0.30) (0.39) (0.53) (0.42) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
0.16** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.13
(0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.75) (0.32) (0.29) (0.18)
0.63 0.56 0.63 0.53 0.58 0.41 1.12 0.91
(0.26) (0.34) (0.39) (0.49) (0.51) (0.66) (0.23) (0.33)
0.16** 0.23*** 0.10 0.19* 0.02 0.09 -0.21 -0.13
(0.02) (0.01) (0.24) (0.07) (0.89) (0.73) (0.20) (0.55)
-0.24** -0.24** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.29** -0.30** -0.31*** -0.32***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
0.02* 0.02* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.08) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1
3 4
intercept
Performancet
2
intercept
Performancet
Performancet-1
ΔROAt
Δln(SALES)t
Performancet-1
ΔROAt
Δln(SALES)t
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
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Table 7  
Pay-performance sensitivity of cash compensation by the existence of the foreign block shareholders 
 
 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests by the existence of the foreign block shareholders.  If a 
firm reports the existence of the foreign shareholders that own more than 5%, Foreign Block = 1, otherwise 
Foreign Block = 0.  The sample is split by the existence of Foreign blockholders at year t-1.  The 
dependent variable of Models I and II is the log change of total cash compensation, and the dependent 
variable of Models III and IV is the log change of average cash compensation.  Performancet in Models I 
and III is log change in market values between t-1 and t, and Performancet in Models II and IV is stock 
return, which is calculated by ln(Price)t – ln(Price)t-1.  ∆ROAt is the change of the returns on assets.  
∆ln(Sales )t  is calculated by ln(Sales)t – ln(Sales)t-1.   COMPENSATIONt-1 is the first lagged variable of 
each dependent variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in the number of all directors, executives, and auditors.  
***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
Foreign Blockholder
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 432 432 432 432 224 224 224 224
R2 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.25
0.38*** 0.39*** 0.33*** 0.32*** -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.71) (0.65) (0.53) (0.86)
0.08** 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09
(0.03) (0.11) (0.23) (0.16) (0.17) (0.31) (0.14) (0.23)
0.02 0.05* 0.04 0.07* 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.05
(0.56) (0.09) (0.12) (0.05) (0.53) (0.47) (0.77) (0.47)
-0.17 -0.09 -0.11 -0.09 1.50* 1.45* 1.57** 1.49*
(0.36) (0.62) (0.58) (0.65) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
0.17** 0.18** 0.15* 0.16* 0.19 0.21 0.05 0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.27) (0.22) (0.78) (0.77)
-0.25*** -0.25*** -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.20** -0.20** -0.27*** -0.28***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
1
intercept
Performancet
Performancet-1
ΔROAt
Δln(SALES)t
0
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Table 8  
Pay-performance sensitivity of cash compensation by chaebol and foreign shares 
 
 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests by Chaebol and Foreign shares.  We construct 4 portfolios by 
Low/High foreign and Chaebol/Non-Chaebol firms (Non-Chaebol/Low Foreign, Non-Chaebol/High Foreign, 
Chaebol/Low Foreign, Chaebol/High Foreign).   Low/High Foreign is determined by the median of the foreign shares 
at the previous year.   Chaebol is determined by family-owned conglomerates among the 62 largest conglomerates 
announced by the Fair Trade Committee of the Republic of Korea.  The dependent variable of Models I and II is the log 
change of total cash compensation, and the dependent variable of Models III and IV is the log change of average cash 
compensation.  Performancet in Models I and III is log change in market values between t-1 and t, and Performancet in 
Models II and IV is stock return, which is calculated by ln(Price)t – ln(Price)t-1.  ∆ROAt is the change of the returns on 
assets.  ∆ln(Sales )t  is calculated by ln(Sales)t – ln(Sales)t-1.   COMPENSATIONt-1 is the first lagged variable of each 
dependent variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in the number of all directors, executives, and auditors.  ***, **, and * 
denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
Foreign Share
Chaebol
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 193 193 193 193 135 135 135 135
R2 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.32
-0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.12 0.18 0.08 0.19 0.13
(0.24) (0.35) (0.40) (0.11) (0.33) (0.69) (0.25) (0.45)
0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.10* 0.15**
(0.89) (0.94) (0.18) (1.00) (0.13) (0.15) (0.09) (0.04)
0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01
(0.32) (0.34) (0.23) (0.58) (0.37) (0.51) (0.87) (0.89)
-0.22 -0.21 -0.20 -0.25 0.74 0.86 0.60 0.48
(0.31) (0.37) (0.32) (0.22) (0.25) (0.20) (0.34) (0.46)
0.15 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.35** 0.30** 0.36** 0.33**
(0.26) (0.26) (0.17) (0.29) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
-0.27*** -0.26*** -0.45*** -0.44*** -0.12 -0.15 -0.23** -0.28***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.17) (0.02) (0.00)
0.04** 0.04** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Foreign Share
Chaebol
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 144 144 144 144 184 184 184 184
R2 0.38 0.37 0.25 0.24 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.29
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.22**
(0.63) (0.42) (0.53) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
0.05 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.20*** 0.11 0.18*** 0.17*
(0.33) (0.29) (0.66) (0.61) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.05)
0.09 0.08 0.10* 0.08 0.12* 0.16** 0.15* 0.22**
(0.13) (0.23) (0.10) (0.31) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02)
0.21 0.04 0.92 0.75 0.88 0.72 1.18 0.91
(0.73) (0.95) (0.23) (0.28) (0.20) (0.32) (0.17) (0.30)
0.13 0.19 -0.12 -0.06 0.04 0.15 -0.02 0.09
(0.40) (0.23) (0.44) (0.70) (0.73) (0.29) (0.88) (0.50)
-0.27*** -0.28*** -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.32*** -0.34*** -0.33*** -0.34***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Low Low 
intercept
Performancet
Performancet-1
ΔROAt
Non-chaebol Chaebol
Δln(SALES)t
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
High High
intercept
Non-chaebol Chaebol
Performancet
Performancet-1
ΔROAt
Δln(SALES)t
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
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Table 9  
Pay-performance sensitivity of cash compensation by family and foreign shares 
 
 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests by family and foreign shares.  We construct 4 portfolios 
by Low/High foreign and family shares (Low Family/Low Foreign, Low Family/High Foreign, High 
Family/Low Foreign, High Family/High Foreign).   Low/High Foreign and Family is determined by the 
median of each variable at the previous year.   The dependent variable of Models I and II is the log change 
of total cash compensation, and the dependent variable of Models III and IV is the log change of average 
cash compensation.  Performancet in Models I and III is log change in market values between t-1 and t, and 
Performancet in Models II and IV is stock return, which is calculated by ln(Price)t – ln(Price)t-1.  ∆ROAt is 
the change of the returns on assets.  ∆ln(Sales )t  is calculated by ln(Sales)t – ln(Sales)t-1.   
COMPENSATIONt-1 is the first lagged variable of each dependent variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in 
the number of all directors, executives, and auditors.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% confidence level, respectively.
Foreign Share
Family Share
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 161 161 161 161 167 167 167 167
R2 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.39
0.01 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.38* 0.40* 0.46** 0.48***
(0.86) (0.96) (0.15) (0.38) (0.09) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01)
0.03 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.09* 0.06 0.05 0.07
(0.51) (0.40) (0.90) (0.37) (0.07) (0.29) (0.36) (0.29)
0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.06
(0.79) (0.61) (0.45) (0.59) (0.91) (0.57) (0.60) (0.32)
-0.09 -0.09 -0.04 -0.16 -0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.05
(0.84) (0.84) (0.93) (0.73) (0.79) (0.97) (0.72) (0.80)
0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.23 0.18 0.27* 0.23
(0.34) (0.30) (0.40) (0.41) (0.20) (0.36) (0.08) (0.16)
-0.17* -0.16* -0.23*** -0.21** -0.19* -0.23* -0.41*** -0.45***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.10) (0.06) (0.01) (0.00)
0.05** 0.05** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
Foreign Share
Family Share
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 167 167 167 167 161 161 161 161
R2 0.36 0.37 0.26 0.28 0.36 0.35 0.31 0.31
0.42** 0.37* 0.33* 0.19 0.40*** 0.44*** 0.30*** 0.33***
(0.03) (0.10) (0.07) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
0.16** 0.10 0.13** 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.12
(0.02) (0.18) (0.04) (0.16) (0.17) (0.26) (0.42) (0.17)
0.14* 0.21*** 0.17* 0.24*** 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08
(0.08) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.20) (0.43) (0.24) (0.32)
0.97 0.76 0.66 0.44 0.32 0.23 0.65 0.47
(0.17) (0.27) (0.42) (0.58) (0.60) (0.71) (0.36) (0.51)
0.12 0.27 0.11 0.21 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.01
(0.63) (0.40) (0.67) (0.44) (0.88) (0.66) (0.93) (0.91)
-0.10 -0.13 -0.17* -0.19* -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.43*** -0.44***
(0.54) (0.40) (0.09) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Performancet
Performancet-1
ΔROAt
Δln(SALES)t
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
Δln(SALES)t
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
High High
intercept
Low High
Low Low
intercept
Performancet
Performancet-1
ΔROAt
HighLow
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Table 10 
Correcting selection bias 
 
 
 
This table reports the result of the two-staged regression tests using heckman correction by the level of 
foreign share.  Low/High Foreign is determined by the median of the foreign share at the previous year.  
The dependent variable of Models I and II is the log change of total cash compensation, and the dependent 
variable of Models III and IV is the log change of average cash compensation.  Performancet in Models I 
and III is log changes in market values between t-1 and t, and Performancet in Models II and IV is stock 
return, which is calculated by ln(Price)t – ln(Price)t-1.  ∆ROAt is the change of the returns on assets.  ∆ln(Sales )t  is calculated by ln(Sales)t – ln(Sales)t-1.   COMPENSATIONt-1 is the first lagged variable of 
each dependent variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in the number of all directors, executives, and auditors.  
LAMBDA is the inverse mills ratio from the first-staged probit regression to measure the probability of the 
firm's choice.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
Foreign Share
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 328 328 328 328 328 328 328 328
R2 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.21 0.22
0.57*** 0.53*** 0.49*** 0.45*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.29*** 0.26***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.06 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.12** 0.09* 0.10** 0.11**
(0.13) (0.19) (0.51) (0.19) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.11** 0.14*** 0.12** 0.17***
(0.97) (0.59) (0.46) (0.56) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
-0.10 -0.06 -0.12 -0.14 0.69 0.59 1.11** 0.93*
(0.63) (0.74) (0.54) (0.48) (0.12) (0.19) (0.04) (0.08)
0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.07 0.13 -0.03 0.03
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.36) (0.16) (0.72) (0.76)
-0.24*** -0.25*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.31***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.33
(0.37) (0.64) (0.48) (0.42) (0.51) (0.19) (0.50) (0.33)
LAMBDA
Δln(SALES)t
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
Performancet
Performancet-1
ΔROAt
Low High
intercept
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Table 11 
Pay-performance sensitivity of cash compensation by different levels of corporate governance 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests by the different level of corporate governance system and Foreign 
shares. The level of corporate governance is determined by evaluation of corporate governance system announced by 
Korean Corporate Governance Service.  If a firm is included in good or best level, it is recognized as Good governance 
firm.  If a firm is included in moderate or bad level, it is recognized as Moderate or Bad governance firm.  Low/High 
Foreign is determined by the median of the foreign share at the  previous year.  The dependent variable of Models I and 
II is the log change of total cash compensation, and the dependent variable of Models III and IV is the log change of 
average cash compensation.  Performancet in Models I and III is log change in market values between t-1 and t, and 
Performancet in Models II and IV is stock return, which is calculated by ln(Price)t – ln(Price)t-1.   ∆ROAt is the change 
of the returns on assets.  ∆ln(Sales )t  is calculated by ln(Sales)t – ln(Sales)t-1.   COMPENSATIONt-1 is the first lagged 
variable of each dependent variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in the number of all directors, executives, and auditors.  
***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
Governance Level
Foreign Share
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 32 32 32 32 93 93 93 93
R2 0.32 0.38 0.32 0.34 0.43 0.48 0.36 0.40
-0.34 -0.64 0.03 -0.47 0.24* -0.16 0.22* -0.11
(0.66) (0.20) (0.97) (0.54) (0.07) (0.33) (0.07) (0.52)
0.02 0.32 -0.14 0.25 0.10 0.13 0.06 0.06
(0.95) (0.25) (0.70) (0.49) (0.15) (0.31) (0.40) (0.63)
0.02 -0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.40** 0.50*** 0.33** 0.42***
(0.97) (0.91) (0.95) (0.94) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
-3.12 -5.20 -0.24 -2.92 0.86 0.84 0.61 0.57
(0.50) (0.14) (0.96) (0.51) (0.17) (0.14) (0.36) (0.34)
-0.03 0.17 0.10 0.71 -0.29 -0.26** -0.24 -0.22
(0.99) (0.89) (0.95) (0.60) (0.11) (0.05) (0.15) (0.13)
-0.62 -0.69 -0.46 -0.61 -0.35*** -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.38***
(0.24) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.02 -0.05 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.72) (0.41) (0.00) (0.00)
Foreign Share
Foreign Share
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 296 296 296 296 235 235 235 235
R2 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.22 0.33 0.31 0.23 0.23
0.51*** 0.48*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.19
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.44) (0.27) (0.29)
0.06* 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.13** 0.08* 0.10* 0.11**
(0.10) (0.21) (0.46) (0.28) (0.04) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05)
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.08* 0.07 0.09* 0.10*
(0.63) (0.48) (0.24) (0.39) (0.07) (0.16) (0.07) (0.07)
-0.15 -0.11 -0.21 -0.22 0.65 0.62 1.16 0.98
(0.54) (0.65) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.39) (0.19) (0.28)
0.16 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.30* 0.39** 0.12 0.19
(0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.19) (0.07) (0.03) (0.50) (0.31)
-0.27*** -0.28*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.29***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
ΔROAt
Δln(SALES)t
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
Good
Moderate / Bad
Low High
intercept
Performancet
Low High
intercept
Performancet
Performancet-1
Performancet-1
ΔROAt
Δln(SALES)t
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
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Table 12  
Long-run pay-performance sensitivity and average foreign share changes 
 
Dependent 
Variable Long-run PPS Changes 
Model I II III IV 
N 163  163  163 163  
R2 0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00  
Intercept 1.92 3.22 1.62 2.47 (0.37) (0.15) (0.29) (0.14) 
Average Foreign 
Share Changes 
(2001 - 2003) 
64.39* 52.31 13.46 8.20 
(0.08) (0.60) (0.61) (0.78) 
Dependent 
Variable Average Foreign Share Changes 
Model I II III IV 
N 164  164 164 164  
R2 0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  
Intercept -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Long-run         
PPS Changes     
(2001 - 2003) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.28) (0.89) (0.34) (0.86) 
 
This table reports the result of the regressions between long-run pay-performance sensitivity and average 
foreign share changes as in Hartzell and Starks (2003).  We calculate the change in foreign ownership in 
the early part of our sample, from 2001 to 2003.  Then, we estimate the average pay-performance 
sensitivities from the latter part of the sample (2003 to 2006) and from the early part of the sample (2001 to 
2003) by computing the compensation changes divided by the performance measures.  We then compute 
the difference between two averages to obtain the long-run pay-performance sensitivity.  Total cash 
compensation changes are utilized as compensation measure in Models I and II, and average cash 
compensation are utilized as compensation measure in Models III and IV.  The change in market value is 
used as the performance measure in Models I and III, and stock return is used as the performance measure 
in Models II and IV.  
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Table 13  
Pay-performance sensitivity of cash and option compensation by foreign shares 
 
 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests by the Foreign shares (see Table 2).  Low/High Foreign 
is determined by the median of the foreign share at the previous year.  The dependent variable of Models I 
and II is the log change of cash and option compensation calculated by the addition of cash and stock 
option compensation, and the dependent variable of Models III and IV is the log change of average 
compensation calculated by the cash and option compensation divided by the number of directors, 
executives, and auditors.  Performancet in Models I and III is log change in market values between t-1 and t, 
and Performancet in Models II and IV is stock return, which is calculated by ln(Price)t – ln(Price)t-1.  
∆ROAt is the change of the returns on assets.  ∆ln(Sales )t  is calculated by ln(Sales)t – ln(Sales)t-1.   
COMPENSATIONt-1 is the first lagged variable of each dependent variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in 
the number of all directors, executives, and auditors.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% confidence level, respectively. 
 
Foreign Share
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 328 328 328 328 328 328 328 328
R2 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.48 0.47 0.39 0.39
0.51*** 0.46*** 0.50*** 0.46*** 0.35*** 0.38*** 0.29*** 0.29***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.09** 0.11** 0.06 0.12** 0.18*** 0.15** 0.16*** 0.17***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.16** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.19***
(0.54) (0.19) (0.30) (0.15) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
-0.21 -0.16 -0.20 -0.21 0.81 0.67 1.22** 1.01*
(0.41) (0.52) (0.37) (0.37) (0.10) (0.18) (0.04) (0.08)
0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.11 -0.08 0.02
(0.31) (0.32) (0.30) (0.35) (0.98) (0.27) (0.39) (0.81)
-0.25** -0.27*** -0.32*** -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.38***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Δln(SALES)t
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
Performancet
Performancet-1
ΔROAt
Low High
intercept
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Table 14  
Pay-performance sensitivity of cash and option compensation by family and foreign shares 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests by family and foreign shares.  We construct 4 portfolios by 
Low/High foreign and family shares (Low Family/Low Foreign, Low Family/High Foreign, High Family/Low Foreign, 
High Family/High Foreign).   Low/High Foreign and Family is determined by the median of each variable at the 
previous year.   The dependent variable of Models I and II is the log change of cash and option compensation 
calculated by the addition of cash and stock option compensation, and the dependent variable of Models III and IV is 
the log change of average compensation calculated by the cash and option compensation divided by the number of 
directors, executives, and auditors.  Performancet in Models I and III is log change in market values between t-1 and t, 
and Performancet in Models II and IV is stock return, which is calculated by ln(Price)t – ln(Price)t-1.  ∆ROAt is the 
change of the returns on assets.  ∆ln(Sales )t  is calculated by ln(Sales)t – ln(Sales)t-1.   COMPENSATIONt-1 is the first 
lagged variable of each dependent variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in the number of all directors, executives, and 
auditors.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
Foreign Share
Family Share
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 161 161 161 161 167 167 167 167
R2 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.44
0.00 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.46** 0.51** 0.41** 0.45**
(0.97) (0.94) (0.11) (0.26) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
0.07 0.12 0.05 0.13 0.15** 0.12* 0.10* 0.13*
(0.29) (0.16) (0.51) (0.12) (0.01) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
0.06 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.11*
(0.31) (0.96) (0.14) (0.99) (0.43) (0.21) (0.25) (0.09)
-0.38 -0.40 -0.31 -0.45 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.03
(0.47) (0.43) (0.55) (0.38) (0.93) (0.75) (0.93) (0.91)
0.09 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.16 0.25 0.20
(0.50) (0.44) (0.66) (0.64) (0.29) (0.48) (0.15) (0.27)
-0.26*** -0.24** -0.28*** -0.26** -0.35*** -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.47***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.05** 0.05** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
Foreign Share
Family Share
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 167 167 167 167 161 161 161 161
R2 0.63 0.62 0.54 0.53 0.35 0.34 0.28 0.28
0.46** 0.49** 0.34* 0.30 0.34** 0.39** 0.24* 0.28**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.17) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02)
0.24*** 0.16* 0.22*** 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.13
(0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.10) (0.13) (0.32) (0.30) (0.24)
0.22** 0.22** 0.25** 0.25*** 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.06
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.26) (0.62) (0.29) (0.50)
0.98 0.77 0.88 0.69 0.81 0.77 1.13 0.99
(0.22) (0.29) (0.32) (0.41) (0.24) (0.28) (0.14) (0.20)
-0.09 0.16 -0.16 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.05
(0.76) (0.63) (0.56) (0.88) (0.82) (0.57) (0.91) (0.70)
-0.29*** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.35*** -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.43*** -0.44***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Low Low
intercept
Performancet
Performancet-1
ΔROAt
Low High
Δln(SALES)t
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
High High
intercept
Low High
Performancet
Performancet-1
ΔROAt
Δln(SALES)t
COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
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Essay 2. Does a Salary Cap Really Work? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Excessive executive compensation is cited as one of the causes of the economic 
crisis of 2008.  Therefore, many policymakers and governance advocates suggested that 
an upper limit on executive compensation could help curtail future crises.  Proponents of 
a salary cap often suggest that executive compensation in the U.S. is extremely high, as 
compared with other countries, and high compensation is rooted in greed and excessive 
risk taking.  Limits on compensation, according to proponents, will limit such risk taking.  
Hindery (2008) points out that the ratio of CEO pay to that of average employee in the 
U.S. is around 400, which is much higher than is found in other countries.1  An AFL-CIO 
report (2009) documents that even during one of the worst recessions, the average CEO 
compensation for 200 large U.S. companies increased by 4.5 percent in 2008.  
On the other hand, opponents suggest that limits on compensation are not 
competitive.  Such non-market based salaries will drive talented executives to more 
lucrative positions.  The debate might be settled in the presence of a comprehensive study 
on the efficacy of a salary cap.  Unfortunately, the extant literature is virtually non-
existent on the impact of a regulatory or legislative salary cap on firm performance and 
governance.  The only known evidence of the impact of a salary cap is in professional 
sports.  Dietl et al. (2010) point out that the caps used by professional sports teams may 
                                                 
1 For example, the ratio of CEO pay to average employee compensation is around 22 in the U.K., 20 in 
Canada, and 11 in Japan (Hindery, 2008).   
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be of use to policymakers and governance experts in the application of such caps to the 
corporate world.   
  While the extant literature includes studies on the impact of government 
regulation on executive compensation, ours is the first, to our knowledge that explicitly 
examines the efficacy of a salary cap.  We add to the literature by examining which 
factors influence the effectiveness of compensation regulation, particularly regulation 
regarding the upper limit on executive compensation.  In order to determine the 
effectiveness of the U.S. government policy, we can study other countries where 
compensation limits are employed.  We find that a South Korean regulation requires 
shareholders to determine the maximum amount of total compensation (hereinafter, the 
cap) for all executives, directors, and auditors unless the cap is set by the corporate 
charter. 2   The purpose of the regulation is obviously to avoid granting excess 
compensation to executives.  However, setting a salary cap may not solve all problems 
with excess compensation which has been linked to poor firm performance.  Using U.S. 
data, Core et al., (1999) find that excess compensation is generally associated with poor 
governance structures and greater agency problems.  They also find that firms with 
greater agency problems perform worse.   Bebchuk et al. (2004) argue that powerful 
CEOs control their boards and are therefore able to maximize their own compensation to 
the detriment of the firm.  At the root of their argument is the idea that corruption exists 
in the pay setting arrangement and this corruption leads to managerial power, decreasing 
firm value.   Some argue that the optimal compensation contract is one designed with a 
large pay-performance sensitivity (PPS).  This contract should mitigate the agency 
                                                 
2 In India, the compensation of executive pay has a maximum based on a percent of net profits (Masilamani 
and Kumar, 2009). 
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problem (and would minimize excess compensation) is one that gives manager incentives 
to act in ways that increase shareholder wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  However 
Brick, Palmon and Wald (2010) suggest that the increases in PPS are negatively related 
to future stock returns, suggesting the risk-aversion effect dominates the incentive effect.  
Moreover, Kato et al. (2007) and Garner and Kim (2010) find that pay-performance 
sensitivity exists only in certain corporate governance environments in South Korea, 
suggesting that the effectiveness of government regulation may have limits. 
 In this paper, we examine the efficacy of a salary cap. First, we focus on the firm 
ownership structure.  The monitoring role of institutional shareholders has been well 
documented in the literature.  Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that the level of institutional 
ownership is positively associated with PPS and negatively associated with executive 
compensation.  Moreover, Eldenburg and Krishnan (2008) document that incentive 
contracting varies as a function of ownership, particularly disperse ownership.  They 
suggest that tying compensation to performance is more important to the circumvention 
of agency problems when ownership is disperse.   Kato et al. (2007) find that only non-
chaebol firms, which are not owned by large family conglomerates, have pay-
performance sensitivity in Korea.  Similarly, Garner and Kim (2010) show that pay-
performance sensitivity is observed only in firms with a high level of foreign shares.  
This paper uses foreign and family shares to determine the effectiveness of salary caps 
under different ownership structures.  A high level of foreign shares may imply that the 
firm has a good external monitoring system.  On other hand, the meaning of a high level 
of family shares may be ambiguous.  Especially, in emerging markets like Korea, a high 
level of family shares may lead to an inappropriate wealth transfer problem such as 
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tunneling (Johnson et al., 2000).  Simultaneously, a high level of family shares can 
mitigate agency problems, which may positively affect firm value.  As the prior literature 
suggests, pay-performance sensitivity is one of the most widely used measures to assess 
whether the compensation package is well-designed or not.  In this paper, we examine 
cap-performance sensitivity alongside pay-performance sensitivity because we are 
interested in the effectiveness of setting the upper limit on compensation.   
 Along with cap-performance sensitivity, we investigate the relation between the 
excess salary cap and the difference between the salary cap and paid compensation.  
Since an extremely large gap between the cap and actual salary may imply that the cap is 
ineffective, determining the factors that affect the gap is crucial.    
 We also use the difference between current compensation and the salary cap for 
the next year (set at the annual meeting) as a measure of managerial work incentives. 
Using this measure, we can see the relation between performance and work incentives.  
By doing so, we can examine whether the incentives are properly determined by prior 
performance.  We also use the level of foreign shares as a proxy of an effective external 
monitoring to confirm that external monitoring is a critical factor for an effective salary 
cap system. 
 Lastly, we examine the dynamic relations between pay-performance sensitivity 
and managerial incentives.  As previously said, the margin between current compensation 
and future cap may be a measure of managerial incentives.  However, it may be true only 
for firms with a high degree of pay-performance sensitivity.  If a firm's compensation is 
not related to performance, a manager's effort may not be related to the degree of 
incentives. 
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Using a sample of 158 Korean firms between 2003 and 2007, our empirical 
findings suggest that a salary cap system may work only in certain situations.  Cap-
performance sensitivity is significant only in firms with a high level of foreign shares, 
while no significant sensitivity is observable in firms with a low level of foreign shares.  
Also, only the cap on total salary for all executives, directors, and auditors is sensitive to 
prior performance in the firms with a high level of family shares, while the cap on 
average salary is not significant to performance.  In the firms with a low level of family 
shares, we do not find any significant cap-performance sensitivity.  When we split the 
sample using both foreign and family shares, we do not find any significant cap-pay 
sensitivities if foreign shares are low. 
 The analysis of the gap between the salary cap and actual compensation also 
confirms the role of an external monitoring mechanism.  We find that the cap-pay 
difference (the gap) may be caused by either a high excess salary cap or a low level of 
excess compensation.  However, if foreign shares are high, only excess compensation 
determines the degree of the cap-pay difference, not an excessive level of salary cap.  
With an effective monitoring system, the company pays a lower level of compensation 
relative to the cap to avoid excessive pay.  The cap-pay difference is, therefore, not a 
result of a high excess salary cap. 
 As a robustness test, we regress the incentives measured by the difference 
between the future salary cap and current compensation on prior performance and find 
results consistent with our main results.  Overall, the incentives are determined by 
performance, but only for firms with a high level of foreign shares.  Again, we conclude 
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that an effective external monitoring device is necessary to ensure an effective salary cap 
system.   
 We also compare Tobin's Q by splitting the sample across levels of both pay-
performance sensitivity and managerial incentives.  We use the level of foreign shares as 
a proxy of the degree of pay-performance sensitivity and the difference between the 
future salary cap and current compensation as a proxy of managerial incentives.  We find 
that only firms that both the level of foreign shares and managerial incentives are high 
present higher firm value comparing with the firms in other groups.   The results confirm 
that a salary cap may be effectively used as a measure of managerial incentives only in 
the presence of effective external monitoring. 
 This study contributes to a better understanding of the advantages and 
disadvantages of a salary cap system that has been adopted by the U.S. government.  By 
showing the benefits and shortcomings of the Korean experience, we document that 
better corporate governance policies may be more important than setting a salary cap.  
This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides background information and the 
hypotheses of this paper.  In Section 3, we introduce the sample and define the variables 
used in the paper along with the methodology and summary statistics.  Section 4 details 
the empirical findings of the study, and Section 5 provides some robustness tests.  Section 
6 provides policy implications and Section 7 summarizes and concludes the study. 
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2. Background and Hypotheses 
 
2.1. Salary Cap in the U.S. 
 
In February 2009, the Obama administration announced that the executive 
compensation of firms that received funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) should be limited as a condition of the bail-out from the distress caused by the 
financial crisis in 2008.  Over the remainder of 2009, lawmakers debated what limits 
should be imposed.  In December of 2009, Kenneth Feinberg, the Special Master for 
Executive Compensation of the Obama administration and so-called “pay czar,” outlined 
the new compensation limits, which included a $500,000 limit on cash compensation as 
well as other restrictions, to banks that received “exceptional assistance” from the bank 
bailout.  Previously, that same year, on July 31, 2009, the United States (U.S.) House of 
Representatives (House) passed an amended version of H.R. 3269, the “Say-on-Pay Bill,” 
which requires a non-binding vote by shareholders to approve executive compensation 
(Seitzinger, 2009).  On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the “Restoring American 
Financial Stability Act of 2010” into law.  One of its provisions is giving shareholders a 
non-binding vote on executive compensation.  These events reflect the public outrage 
over the seemingly excessive compensation packages granted to executives, despite the 
failure of their firms.  Prohibiting the excessive compensation is not only an issue in the 
U.S. but also around the world.  The Financial Stability Board (hereinafter “FSB”) of G-
20 nations (as of September 25, 2009) recommends that variable compensation should be 
limited as a percentage of total net revenue.  Also, it suggests that CEO compensation for 
55 
 
 
 
troubled financial institutions should be subject to independent review and approval.  In 
addition, The G-20 Summit in Toronto in June 2010 confirms the importance of 
implementing those FSB's standards. 
 The extant literature is brimming with studies on executive compensation.3  In 
general, the finance literature has focused on the agency problems of pay arrangements 
where optimal contracts should produce managerial incentives that increase firm value, 
and therefore shareholder wealth.  Indeed, a large body of literature examines pay-for-
performance, that is, whether changes in pay are related to changes in shareholder wealth 
(Jensen and and Murphy, 1990; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Hartzell and Starks, 
2003).   
 Another body of literature focuses on the relation between U.S. government 
regulation and executive compensation.  Perry and Zenner (2001) indicate that the 1992 - 
1993 compensation reforms in the U.S. have some effect in reducing salary and salary 
growth rate along with increase pay-performance sensitivity.  John et al. (2006) posit that 
effective monitoring, including regulations, may increase pay-performance sensitivity in 
the banking industry.  Dicks (2009) develops a theoretical model that shows the benefits 
of government regulation by lowering executive compensation.   
 Recently, many countries have adopted Say-on-Pay provisions and this has 
become another area of study on executive compensation.  Cai and Walkling (2009) 
examine the U.S. Say-on-Pay legislation and find that the market positively reacts for 
firms with high excess compensation and with low pay-performance sensitivity.  Ferri 
and Maber (2009) investigate Say-on-Pay in the U. K. and find an increase in the 
                                                 
3 For a thorough review of the excess compensation literature, see Devers et al. (2007). 
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sensitivity of pay to poor performance.  Carter and Zamora (2009) also use a sample of 
U.K. firms between 2002 and 2006 and show that shareholders tend to disapprove of 
higher compensation, weak pay-performance sensitivity in bonus, and greater potential 
dilution in equity pay. 
 Some researchers emphasize the ineffectiveness of government regulation on 
executive compensation in the U.S.  Murphy (1995) criticizes the 1992 proxy reforms as 
a populist outcome.  Knutt (2005) points out that governmental regulation of executive 
compensation failed to decrease excess compensation, and suggests that companies 
should solve the problem by adopting better corporate governance systems.  Dew-Becker 
(2009) reviews the history of executive compensation regulation and surveys the 
literature on the effect of the policies.  He shows that there is little evidence that any of 
policies significantly impact executive compensation.  Due to the skewness of the 
compensation distribution, Clementi and Cooley (2009) find that many CEOs, in fact, are 
not excessively paid since the compensation distribution is highly skewed.  They show 
that the median compensation in 2006 was only $4.85 million, while the average is much 
higher, $10.8 million, suggesting that the income inequality problem may be 
exaggerated.4   In legal studies, Verret (2009) posits that the limit of compensation in the 
U.S. may harm the economy in the globalized environment.  He indicates that non-U.S. 
firms can hire talented executives by paying more than the U.S. maximum levels.  Macey 
(2009) also argues that the legislative salary limits could lead to even higher levels of 
compensation as was the case with the 1993 compensation tax code reforms which were 
intended to limit excessive growth in executive compensation. 
                                                 
4  If we use $4.85 million as a benchmark of CEO pay, the ratio of CEO pay to average employee 
compensation is around 163 times. 
57 
 
 
 
 What is absent in the extant literature is an extensive analysis of executive salary 
caps.  Dietl et al. (2010) suggest that regulators and policymakers can look to 
professional sports teams to learn about the impact of salary caps since there is a long 
history in this industry of cap use.   While salary caps are used in professional sports and 
much can be learned in this setting, we directly examine the use of salary caps in existing 
firms to determine the efficacy of such a system.  In particular, we examine the 
effectiveness of a salary cap on subsequent firm performance and governance.5   
 
2.2. Salary Cap in Korea 
 
 Article 388 of Korean Commercial Code is as follows: 
 
If the amount of remuneration to be received by directors has not been 
determined by the articles of incorporation, it shall be determined by a 
resolution at a general shareholder's meeting.6 
 
 This provision indicates that a firm should vote on the maximum amount of the 
compensation to all executives, directors, and auditors unless the corporate charter has 
already defined it.  Since it is a mandate provision, any bylaws or charters in violation of 
the code renders its purpose ineffective (Kwon, 2004).  Because shareholders set only 
total compensation for all executives, the board usually distributes a salary to each 
                                                 
5 There are also a few prior studies regarding executive compensation in Korea.  See Kim (1986), Kwon 
(2003), Kato et al. (2007), and Garner and Kim (2010). 
 
6 Korean Commercial Code Article 388 (Remuneration for Director) 
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executive/director.  Although the purpose of the provision is clearly to avoid managerial 
misconduct, asymmetric information and majority shareholders who are not interested in 
prohibiting executives' indiscretions may render the cap as ineffective (Kim, 1986).7 
 Indeed, the notion that executive compensation should be determined by the 
change of shareholders' wealth was not followed in a number of Korean firms.  Kato et al. 
(2007) find that only non-chaebol8 firms have a significant pay-performance sensitivity 
during 1998 and 2001.  Since most chaebol firms at that time were heavily controlled by 
a managing family, their findings are consistent with Kim's concerns regarding the law’s 
limitation (Kim, 1986).  Although chaebol reforms are somewhat successful, the 
empirical evidence found by Garner and Kim (2010) that only firms with a high level of 
foreign shares have pay-performance sensitivity reveals that a salary cap system may 
have shortcomings. 
 
2.3. Hypothesis Development 
 
 Ownership structure may be critical for a salary cap system to be effective.  As 
Kim (1986) points out, if a majority of shareholders are not interested in avoiding excess 
compensation, the salary cap decision may be unrelated to firm performance.  Lemmon 
                                                 
7 One of the main differences between the Korean salary cap and that required of TARP banks is the source 
of the limit.  In Korea, while the government mandates that a firm have a cap, it is the shareholders that set 
the cap.  In contrast, the TARP limits are uniform for each firm and are both mandated and set by the U.S. 
government.  While say-on-pay regulations are mandated now by law in the U.S., these should not be 
considered analogous to a cap.  While shareholders are able to vote on the salary (as is the case in the cap 
system in Korea), shareholders are simply given a compensation report and asked to vote “yes” or “no.”   
 
8 Chaebol is defined as Korean large family-owned conglomerates.  Because there is no clear cut-off for 
firm size, most studies use the monthly announcement from the Korean Fair Trade Committee (KFTC) to 
determine whether a firm is included in chaebol.   
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and Lins (2003) find that ownership structure may be important to determine whether 
insiders expropriate minority shareholders in East Asia.  If majority shareholders who are 
managers vote upon their own compensation, the regulation will obviously be ineffective.  
In order to mitigate these problems, qualified external monitoring systems may be critical.  
Effective external monitoring may enhance the corporate governance and mitigate 
missteps made in the setting of the salary cap.  Therefore, our first hypothesis is as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: If the firm has a higher ownership level of qualified external monitors, the 
salary cap will be more sensitive to prior performance. 
 
 Unlike external monitors, owner-managers may play completely different roles.  
Because a high level of insider ownership may reduce the power of external monitoring, 
firms with a high level of insiders' ownership are more likely to set salary caps unrelated 
to prior performance.  Claessens et al. (2000) point out that concentrated ownership in 
East Asia may negatively affect the evolution of corporate governance frameworks and 
may be a barrier to policy reforms.  Hence, our corollary to the first hypothesis is as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: If the firm has a higher level of insider ownership, the salary cap will be 
less sensitive to prior performance. 
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 The other factor we are interested in is the difference between the salary cap and 
actual compensation.  If we assume that compensation is perfectly related to performance, 
the optimal level of the salary cap should be the same as the compensation level, resulting 
in no difference.  If there is a difference between the cap and pay, it may be caused either 
by a high salary cap or by a low level of actual compensation.  If a firm has an ineffective 
salary cap system, it may set a very high level of salary cap to allow more flexibility for 
compensation, leading to a large cap-pay difference.  Although it is always possible that 
executives are underpaid, more problems arise when executives are overpaid.  Therefore, 
if a firm has an effective external monitoring system, which will assist in the avoidance 
of an excessively high salary cap, its cap-pay difference should not be caused by high 
level of salary cap.  It should only happen if the performance is not sufficient for 
compensation to be set at the cap.  In this case, compensation will be lower than the cap.  
As discussed in the first hypothesis, effective external monitoring may mitigate the 
ineffectiveness of salary cap system.  Hence, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: If the firm has a higher ownership level of qualified external monitors, the 
difference between the salary cap and actual compensation is not related to 
excess salary cap. 
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3. Data and Empirical Methods 
 
3.1. Data 
 
 Our sample consists of 158 firms from the KOSPI 200, which is the Korean large-
cap stock index and is similar to the S&P 500 Index in the U.S.  We collect original data 
from 2001 to 2007, but since our final sample requires lagged terms and changes in 
lagged terms, our final sample consists of a panel dataset of 790 observations, spanning 
from 2003 to 2007.   
All compensation and ownership data are collected from annual reports, which 
firms are required to file each year to the Korean Financial Supervisory Service (KFSS).  
We collect stock prices and foreign share data from KOSCOM Datamall and financial 
statement data from Thomson Datastream.  In order to avoid the outlier effect, we 
winsorize all variables at the 95% level. 
 
3.2. Compensation and Performance Measures 
 
 The limitation of compensation studies for the Korean market is that the Korean 
regulatory system does not require the firm to report individual compensation packages.  
Unlike U.S. requirements, Korean regulation requires that firms only report the total cash 
compensation to all executives, directors, and auditors.  The Korean law also only 
requires the shareholders to vote for maximum compensation to all executives, directors, 
and auditors.  Therefore, prior studies regarding Korean executive compensation use total 
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and average compensation as measures of executive pay (Kato et al, 2007; Garner and 
Kim, 2010).  Also, a possible concern of this study is that the salary cap is only restricted 
to cash compensation.  However, since most Korean firms pay most of their 
compensation in the form of cash, unlike in the U.S., setting only a cash salary cap may 
be sufficient to regulate Korean executives (Garner and Kim, 2010). 
 In order to relate compensation to performance, we need a measure of firm 
performance.  Jensen and Murphy (1990) use the log change in market value as an 
independent variable.  However, market value is highly correlated with the size of the 
firm.  In order to avoid the size effect, Kaplan (1994) uses stock returns as a performance 
measure.  In this study, we use both variables for the performance measure.  Also, we use 
lagged performance because shareholders vote for the salary cap for the next year, which 
should reflect the previous performance.   
 
3.3. Cap-performance Sensitivity 
 
 We estimate cap-performance sensitivity using a regression similar to the one 
employed in measuring pay-performance sensitivity.  The only difference is that we use 
changes in the salary cap rather than compensation changes as the dependent variable.  
As discussed in the previous section, an individual salary cap is not available in Korea.  
Therefore, as our dependent variables, we use the log change of the total salary cap to all 
executives, directors, and auditors, as well as the log change of average salary cap 
calculated by total salary cap divided by the number of executives, directors, and auditors. 
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 For the performance measures, we use the log changes of market value (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990) and stock returns (Kaplan, 1994).  Because contemporaneous returns 
cannot be used when the salary cap is determined, we use lagged performance to find the 
cap-performance sensitivity in the regression. 
 We also control for the change in ROA and log change in sales as operating 
measures. Since we find that the dependent variables are highly autocorrelated with the 
first lagged term, we use autoregressive order one in the regressions. The change in the 
number of all directors, executives, and auditors is certainly correlated with changes in 
total salary cap.  Therefore, we include the change in the number of all directors, 
executives, and auditors, ∆NumDir, if the dependent variable is log changes in total 
salary cap. Finally, we also include firm and year dummy variables to control firm and 
year fixed effects in the panel regressions.   
 In addition, we also consider the effect of peer groups in determining the level of 
executive compensation as shown in Bizjak et al. (2008).  They find that the U.S. firms 
widely use the benchmark for chief executive officers' compensation.  We can reasonably 
assume that Korean firms are also affected by some benchmarks like U.S. firms.  Industry 
would be certainly one of the important factors to determine the level of executive 
compensation.9  Furthermore, in Korea, compensation policy may be affected not only by 
individual firm's decision but also by a conglomerate-wide decision.  For these reasons, 
we include industry and conglomerate dummies in the regression for calculating the cap-
performance sensitivities.  Therefore, we estimate the following regression model to 
estimate cap-performance sensitivity:  
                                                 
9 We use 3-digit Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC) code to differentiate the industry of the 
firm. 
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∆ lnሺ݈ܵܽܽݎݕ ܥܽ݌ሻ௜௧ ൌ
 ߙ௜௧ ൅ ߚଵܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ∆ܴܱܣ௜,௧ିଵ ൅
ߚଷ∆ lnሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ௜.௧ିଵ ൅  ߚସ∆ lnሺ݈ܵܽܽݎݕ ܥܽ݌ሻ௜.௧ିଵ ൅
ߚହ∆ܰݑ݉ܦ݅ݎ௜.௧ ൅ ߚ௜௧ܨ݅ݎ݉ ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜.௧ ൅ ߚ௜௧ܻ݁ܽݎ ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜.௧ ൅
 ߚ௜௧ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜.௧ ൅ ߚ௜௧ܥ݋݈݊݃݋݉݁ݎܽݐ݁ ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜.௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧    
        (1) 
 
3.4. Cap-pay Difference 
 
 In order to find the relation between the excess salary cap and the cap-pay 
difference (the gap), we must first have a measure of excess salary cap.  We utilize a 
similar methodology as studies which estimate excess compensation (Cai et al., 2009).  
We estimate excess salary cap by calculating the residuals from the following regression: 
 
݈ܵܽܽݎݕ ܥܽ݌௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ ሺܣݏݏ݁ݐሻ௜.௧ ൅ ߚଶܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜.௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ௜,௧ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜.௧ ൅
ߚ௜,௧ܻ݁ܽݎ ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜.௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧                    (2)     
      
  We also estimate excess compensation using the same methodology as seen in 
equation (2).  The only difference is we use the level of compensation instead of the 
salary cap as the dependent variable.  Using excess cap and compensation, we estimate 
what factors are associated with the cap-pay difference by using the following regression: 
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݈݊ ቀ஼௔௣௉௔௬ቁ௜௧ ൌ  ߙ ൅ ߚଵܧݔܿ݁ݏݏ ݈ܵܽܽݎݕ ܥܽ݌௜.௧ ൅ ߚଶܧݔܿ݁ݏݏ ܥ݋݉݌݁݊ݏܽݐ݅݋݊௜.௧ ൅
ߚଷ lnሺܣݏݏ݁ݐ௜.௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߚସܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜.௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହܴܱܣ௜.௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺ܱ݌ݐ݅݋݊௜.௧ିଵ ൅
ߚ଻ lnሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜.௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߚ଼ܰݑ݉ܦ݅ݎ௜.௧ ൅  ߚ௜,௧ܨ݅ݎ݉ ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜.௧ ൅
 ߚ௜,௧ܻ݁ܽݎ ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜.௧ ൅  ߚ௜,௧ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݑ ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜.௧ ൅
 ߚ௜,௧ܥ݋݈݊݃݋݉݁ݎܽݐ݁ ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜.௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧  
                                            (3) 
 
3.5. Summary Statistics 
 
 Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the full sample of 158 Korean firms 
during 2003 and 2007.  The average salary cap of Korean firm for each executive is 
around 511 million Korean Won, equivalent to U.S. $464,545.  On average, each 
executive receives around 353 million Won, equivalent to U.S. $320,909.10  Since we 
estimate excess salary cap and compensation by using the residuals of OLS regressions, 
the mean should be zero due to the specification of the model.  However, interestingly, 
the median of excess salary cap and compensation are all negative, which implies that the 
distribution is skewed, and there may be some firms that pay a substantial amount of 
excess compensation.  The average logarithm of stock return is around 26%, which looks 
very high.  However, because the annual average returns of the KOSPI200 at that time is 
around 22%, high returns for sample firms are understandable. 
                                                 
10 We calculate US Dollar using the exchange rate, US$1 = 1,100 Korean Won. 
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 Table 2 describes the summary statistics segregated by the level of foreign shares.  
We divide the sample using the median of foreign shares each year, and compare mean 
and median using a t-test and a Wilcoxon rank test, respectively.  We find that both the 
salary cap and the compensation level are higher in firms with high foreign shares.  The 
average of the excess average salary cap is statistically significantly higher in firms with 
high foreign shares.  However, the median of total excess compensation is lower for the 
firms with high foreign shares.  Although the mean of the firms with high level of foreign 
shares is larger, the difference is not statistically significant.  The opposite sign between 
mean and median may imply that there are some outliers which distort the average.  
Table 3 shows the summary statistics segregated by the level of family shares.  No 
statistically significant difference can be found for mean or median salary caps and 
compensation level. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Correlation Analysis 
 
 We initially investigate the correlation between excess salary cap and excess 
compensation.  We expect that if a firm has a very high level of excess salary cap, there is 
a high likelihood that it also has a high level of excess compensation, too.  Table 4 shows 
the result of the correlation analysis, and not surprisingly, the correlation between excess 
salary cap and actual compensation is very high and statistically significant regardless of 
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whether we examine total or average compensation data.  Therefore, we can conclude 
that a high level of excess salary cap may lead to a high level of excess compensation. 
 
4.2. Cap-performance Sensitivity 
  
 In order for the salary cap system to be effective, the cap should be based on prior 
performance.  We find evidence of significant cap-performance sensitivity in our sample 
using all four models of equation (1) as shown in Table 5.  This finding suggests that the 
salary cap system may be an effective regulatory device which can preclude "pay-for-
failure".  
  However, as we discussed in the previous section, certain conditions may be 
necessary to ensure that the salary cap system is more effective.  Such conditions may 
include qualified external monitoring.  To measure the effect of qualified external 
monitoring, we split the sample using the level of foreign shareholder ownership.  In the 
Korean market, because many institutional shareholders are subsidiary companies in the 
same conglomerate, one of the purposes of institutional ownership can be for the family 
to control the entire chaebol firm.  Also, the non-subsidiary investors may still have 
business relationships with firm management, implying that the investors have conflicts 
of interests and may not be good monitors.  Choi et al. (2007) find that foreign investor 
holdings have more impact on increasing firm values than their domestic counterparts.  
Garner and Kim (2010) also show that pay-performance sensitivity is only significant in 
the firms with higher level of foreign shares in Korea.  Consistent with our first 
hypothesis, we do not find any significant cap-performance sensitivity for the firms with 
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a low level of foreign shares as shown in Table 6.  Only firms with a high level of foreign 
shares set their salary cap in relation to prior firm performance.  The result is consistent 
with the notion that a good external monitoring environment is essential for a salary cap 
system to be successful.  If external monitoring is not efficient in a firm, its management 
may propose a relatively high level of salary cap regardless of its performance.  Without 
external monitoring, such a proposal may easily pass in the shareholders' meeting. 
 To test Hypothesis 1b, we divide our sample using the median level of family 
shares each year and estimate Equation (2) for each group.11  In Table 7 we show that, 
contrary to our expectation, only firms with a high level of family shares exhibit cap-
performance sensitivity in the model with total salary cap.  However, if we use the 
average salary cap, we find no significance.  If a family owner-manager owns a very high 
level of shares in a firm, he may also be interested in paying executives based on 
performance.  However, it is possible that he is more concerned with total, rather than 
individual compensation.  Because we do not have individual information, we cannot test 
this.  We can only say that our empirical result shows that some level of internal 
monitoring is necessary for the determination of salary cap, but it is not completely 
efficient. 
 It is also possible that the level of family shares is not a critical factor in 
determining cap-performance sensitivity.  Segregating the sample by both foreign and 
family shares, we find that cap-performance sensitivity in firms with high family shares is 
only significant when the level of foreign shares is high (Table 8).  We do not find any 
                                                 
11  Family shares are collected in Special-related shares section of Korean Annual Report.  Although 
special-related shares include non-family insider shares, they are mostly controlled by family-managers 
in Korean family firms.  Therefore, in order to meausre the accurate effect of insider ownership, we also 
include those shares as a family share. 
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significant cap-performance sensitivities in firms with lower level of foreign ownership 
regardless of the level of family shares, suggesting that the level of foreign shares which 
represents an effective external monitor, is a critical factor, while that of family shares is 
not. 
 
4.3. Cap-pay Difference 
 
 The difference between the salary cap and actual compensation may be a result of 
either an excessively high level of salary cap or an excessively low level of actual 
compensation.  Table 9 confirms our expectation.  When we use average salary cap and 
compensation, the cap-pay difference is positively related to the excess salary cap and 
negatively related to excess compensation.  When we use total salary cap and 
compensation, we still find a significantly negative relation between cap-pay difference 
and excess compensation, while the relation with excess salary cap is not statistically 
significant.   
 Table 10 shows that the cap-pay difference varies in the presence of disparate 
corporate governance environments.  We find that only a low level of excess 
compensation leads to cap-pay difference in firms with a high level of foreign shares, 
while both a high salary cap and low compensation levels do.  As we point out in the 
previous section, in a perfect world, the cap-pay difference should be zero.  If a firm sets 
a substantially high salary cap, it may lead to a large gap between the salary cap and 
actual pay, which could be more problematic than the case of a lower level of excess 
compensation.  Because the cap-pay difference in firms with qualified external 
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monitoring is only associated with a lower level of excess compensation, our result 
suggests that the origin of the cap-pay difference is significantly related to the corporate 
governance environment, especially external monitoring.  This is consistent with our 
previous finding using cap-performance sensitivity.  Therefore, having good external 
monitors may be critical to the effectiveness of a salary cap system. 
 
5. Robustness Tests 
 
5.1. Incentive-performance Sensitivity 
 
 Setting the salary cap may be one of the most useful tools in creating incentives 
for managers to work.  If the future salary cap is set with little margin over current 
compensation, executives may lose their motivation to work hard.  If the future salary cap 
is set too high, executives may not work for the maximization of shareholders' wealth 
because they know that the incentive structure is not related to the firm performance.  
Hence, finding the optimal level of the salary cap may be crucial for a salary cap system 
to be effective.   
 In this regard, one of the most critical problems is that it is almost impossible to 
find the exact optimality in practice.  One of the proxies we can use is the sensitivity 
between the level of incentives and prior performance.  In order to examine the 
effectiveness of a salary cap system, we use the following regression and estimate 
incentive-performance sensitivities. 
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݈݊ ቆ ܥܽ݌௜,௧ܲܽݕ௜,௧ିଵቇ  
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൅  ߚ௜,௧ܻ݁ܽݎ ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߚ௜,௧ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜,௧
൅ ߚ௜,௧ܥ݋݈݊݃݋݉݁ݎܽݐ݁ ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
(4) 
 
 Table 11 shows that, overall, incentives are properly determined by prior 
performance.  The coefficients on prior performance in all four models are positive and 
statistically significant.  Since stock options are another form of incentives, the negative 
significant coefficient of option dummy variable also suggests that shareholders might 
want to decrease the amount of cash incentives to avoid excessively high level of 
compensation.12 
 Although a salary cap may play a role in providing a proper level of incentives in 
Korea, it is possible that certain conditions such as the existence of an effective external 
monitoring may be necessary to deem it effective.  Table 12 reports the results of 
regressions using equation (4) split by the level of foreign shares.  Consistent with 
previous results, the level of foreign shares is, again, a critical factor in the effectiveness 
of a salary cap system.  When we use the log changes of market value as a performance 
measure, incentive-performance sensitivities are significant in firms with a higher level of 
                                                 
12 The option dummy variable represents the existence of stock options, not newly granted stock options.  
Therefore, the meaning of the coefficients may be limited because it includes the previously granted 
options (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999).  However, because shareholders may consider that the existence 
of stock options may increase the incentives for managers to work for shareholders' wealth, we include the 
option dummy variable in the regressions. 
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foreign shares.  We do not find significant incentive-performance sensitivities in firms 
with a lower level of foreign shares.  The existence of stock options also plays some roles, 
but only firms with a higher level of foreign shares.  The results also suggest that efficient 
incentive structures may be marked by certain corporate governance structures, not 
simply by setting the limit on executive compensation itself. 
 
5.2. Dynamic Effect between Pay-performance Sensitivity and Managerial Incentive 
 
 As shown in the previous section, the difference between the future salary cap and 
current compensation may be a proxy for measuring managerial incentives.  We already 
find that good external monitoring helps the firm determine the level of incentives related 
to prior performance.  In this regard, we  attempt to find the dynamic effect between pay-
performance sensitivity and managerial incentives using a salary cap.  If the firms have a 
low level of pay-performance sensitivity, their managers may not be incentivized by a 
salary cap since their compensation is not very related to their performance.  Therefore, 
we expect that the difference between the future salary cap and current compensation 
may be a proxy for managerial incentives only in the firms with a high level of pay-
performance sensitivity. 
 In order to confirm our expectation, we split the sample using the proxies of pay-
performance sensitivity and managerial incentives, and compute the average firm value in 
each group.  As a proxy for pay-performance sensitivity, we use the level of foreign 
shares as found in  Garner and Kim (2010).13 We find that only firms with high level of 
                                                 
13 We find that only firms with high level of foreign shares in Korea have pay-performance sensitivity, 
consistent with Garner and Kim (2010). 
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foreign shares in Korea have pay-performance sensitivity.  As a proxy for managerial 
incentives, we use the difference between the future salary cap and current compensation 
as documented in the previous sections.  We compute both the average Market-to-Book 
value and Tobin's Q to proxy for firm value. 
 Table 13 shows that firms with a high level of both foreign shares and managerial 
incentives are associated with higher firm value as compared to firms in the other 
groups. .   The results may imply that managerial incentives derived from the use of 
salary cap can be effective only if the firm has high level of pay-performance sensitivity.  
In other words, if the salary cap is set too narrowly, compared to the prior compensation, 
it may limit managerial incentives and negatively affect firm performance. 
 In Table 13, we proxy for pay-performance sensitivity using foreign ownership.  
As a further robustness, we estimate pay-performance sensitivity of each firm 
individually using the beta coefficient of univariate regressions of log changes of average 
compensation on prior year stock returns.  We then replicate the tests from Table 13 in 
Table 14 and find qualitatively similar results.  We find significantly higher firm value in 
the group with a high level of both estimated pay-performance sensitivity and managerial 
incentives.  The finding confirms that high level of pay-performance sensitivity is a 
necessary condition for a salary cap to incentivize managers.  Again, since effective 
external monitoring can improve pay-performance sensitivity of the firm, it may be one 
of the most critical conditions for a salary cap to work effectively. 
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6. Policy Implications 
 
 Our empirical results from the Korean sample have some policy implications not 
only for Korea, but also for the U.S.  First, the most important factor in the 
implementation of a salary cap system is not the setting of the rule, but rather the building 
of a better firm-level governance system.  Our findings suggest that a salary cap is 
ineffectively set if a firm does not have a good external monitoring system.  The analysis 
of the cap-pay difference may strengthen this argument.  In Korea, the level of foreign 
shares is one of the determinants of the cap-pay difference, which may suggest that salary 
caps are effective with other forms of monitoring in place.  The characteristics of foreign 
shareholders are similar to qualified institutional shareholders in the U.S.  Garner and 
Kim (2010) find a positive relation between the level of foreign shares and pay-
performance sensitivity, which is comparable to findings of Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
regarding the impact of institutional shareholders in the U.S.  Therefore, improving the 
corporate governance itself may be a better solution to repair the excessive compensation 
problem not only in Korea, but also in the U.S. 
 Our findings using incentive-performance sensitivities confirm the main 
implication of this study.  Without effective external monitoring, a salary cap is not an 
effective incentive for managers.  Since executives of those firms know that incentive 
structures are not related to performance, setting a high upper limit on compensation may 
not increase the incentives for managers.  Another potential problem is the salary cap 
may limit the incentives for talented managers.  If the margin between the salary cap and 
the compensation is too narrowly set, talented managers may consider leaving the firms 
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rather than working harder.   Verret’s (2009) warning that talented executives may leave 
for countries without salary caps suggest that limits on incentives may negatively affect 
firm performance.  In addition, Kim (2010) finds a negative market reaction for TARP 
firms on the announcement of limiting the executive compensations in the U.S., which 
may be evidence that investors are concerned about losing talented workers who face 
salary limits.  
 In theory, an optimal level of salary cap that maximizes the benefit and minimizes 
the cost may exist.  However, in practice, it is very difficult to find the exact optimality.  
Moreover, because the optimal level can be different for each firm, governmental 
regulation cannot solve this problem by setting a fixed amount of compensation for all 
firms.  Dietl et al. (2010) also suggest that a salary cap relative to performance may be 
more effective than setting an absolute ceiling of compensation for professional sports 
leagues.  For the same reason, if regulation approaches the compensation as an inequality 
problem, we may lose substantial benefits from giving incentives for talented people to 
work harder. 
 
7. Conclusion 
  
 Using a sample of Korean firms during the period from 2003 to 2007, we 
investigate the effectiveness of a salary cap system.  Initially, we find that excess salary 
cap is highly positively correlated with excess compensation.  From the estimation of 
cap-performance sensitivity in the sample, we find that the change in the salary cap is, in 
general, sensitive to the prior performance of the firm.  However, if a firm lacks an 
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efficient external monitoring system, the cap-performance sensitivity is not significant.  
Only in the firms with a high level of foreign shares in Korea do we find statistically 
significant cap-performance sensitivity. 
 The analysis of cap-pay difference also confirms our argument.  Our results show 
that a large cap-pay difference may be caused either by a high level of excess salary cap 
or by a low level of excess compensation.  However, if the level of foreign shares is 
higher, we find that the cap-pay difference is only associated with a lower level of excess 
compensation, not by an excessively high salary cap, confirming the idea that good 
corporate governance may improve the effectiveness of a salary cap system. 
 We also find evidence that our proxy of managerial incentives, the difference 
between the future salary cap and current compensation, is positively related to prior 
performance only when the firm has a high level  of foreign share ownership, suggesting 
that incentive structures using a salary cap may properly work only in the presence of 
effective external monitoring.  Furthermore, we find significantly higher firm value only 
in the group with a high level of both estimated pay-performance sensitivity and the 
managerial incentives, implying that a high level of pay-performance sensitivity is a 
necessary condition for a salary cap to incentivize the management. Because, in practice, 
it may be impossible to find an optimal and fixed salary cap for each company, 
improving firm-level corporate governance may be a better solution to repair the 
problems that arise from highly excessive executive compensation. 
 In subsequent versions of the paper, we will examine two other important factors 
regarding a salary cap system.  First, we will attempt to uncover what characteristics of a 
salary cap are most effective.  According to Dietl et al. (2010), salary caps which are set 
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relative to past performance may dominate ones that set an absolute cap.  Setting the cap 
relative to performance, according to the authors, ensures financial sustainability and 
supports a long-term perspective in professional sports.  We will explore such an analysis 
for corporations.  Second, we will also examine the characteristics of a salary cap which 
can prevent excessive risk-taking.  We hope that these future analyses will add to the 
current study’s contributions.     
78 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median 
Total Cap                    
(millions) 790 3,555 6,063 2,300 
Average Cap                 
(millions) 790 406 511 274 
Total Compensation            
(millions) 790 2,084 4,364 1,283 
Average Compensation       
(millions) 790 233 353 154 
Cap-Pay Difference 790 56.59% 40.77% 48.04% 
Excess Total Cap              
(millions) 790 0 5,250 -203 
Excess Average Cap         
(millions) 790 0 426 -18 
Excess Total Compensation 
(millions) 790 0 3,913 -217 
Excess Average Compensation 
(millions) 790 0 308 -15 
Market Value                 
(billions) 790 2,595,532 7,585,037 515,526 
Δln(Market Value) 790 31.66% 54.72% 26.36% 
Return 790 26.01% 50.59% 23.30% 
 
The table reports the summary statistics for the full sample of 158 KOPSI 200 firms from 2003 to 2007.  
Total Salary Cap is the maximum amount of compensation that firm may pay to all of its executives, 
directors, and auditors.  Average Salary Cap is calculated by dividing Total Salary Cap by the number of all 
executives, directors, and auditors. Total Compensation is the total compensation for all executives, 
auditors, and directors, and Average Compensation is calculated by dividing Total Compensation by the 
number of executives, directors, and auditors.  Excess Salary Cap and Compensation is estimated by the 
residual of regressing the level of salary cap or compensation on log of asset, previous return, industry 
dummies, year dummies.  Market Value is the market value of the firm and Return is log difference 
between current and previous year-end stock prices. 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics by the level of foreign shares 
 
Variable 
Low Foreign Share (N = 395) High Foreign Share (N = 395) 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Total Cap               
(millions) 2,281.51 1,700.00 4,828.01*** 3,000.00*** 
Average Cap             
(millions) 277.48 233.33 534.54*** 333.33*** 
Total Compensation       
(millions) 1,296.52 991.16 2870.50*** 1,694.11*** 
Average Compensation    
(millions) 157.19 122.08 307.84*** 192.00*** 
Cap-Pay Difference 55.52% 47.35% 57.65% 48.07% 
Excess Total Cap         
(millions) -263.54 -95.59 263.54 -359.72 
Excess Average Cap       
(millions) -31.44 -8.44 31.44** -35.63 
Excess Total 
Compensation (millions) -155.84 -76.97 155.84 -301.34** 
Excess Average 
Compensation (millions) -17.61 -8.24 17.61 -26.14 
Market Value            
(billions) 878,799 241,110 4,312,264*** 1,386,963*** 
Δln(Market Value) 39.21% 32.10% 24.12%*** 20.05%*** 
Return 30.52% 30.10% 21.49%** 19.24%** 
 
The table reports the summary statistics for the full sample of 158 KOPSI 200 firms from 2003 to 2007 by 
the level of foreign shares.  Low/High Foreign is determined by the median of the foreign share at the 
previous year.  Total Salary Cap is the maximum amount of compensation that firm may pay to all of its 
executives, directors, and auditors.  Average Salary Cap is calculated by dividing Total Salary Cap by the 
number of all executives, directors, and auditors. Total Compensation is the total compensation for all 
executives, auditors, and directors, and Average Compensation is calculated by dividing Total 
Compensation by the number of executives, directors, and auditors.  Excess Salary Cap and Compensation 
is estimated by the residual of regressing the level of salary cap or compensation on log of asset, previous 
return, industry dummies, year dummies.  Market Value is the market value of the firm and Return is log 
difference between current and previous year-end stock prices.  We test the equal mean and median using t 
and wilcoxon statistics.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, 
respectively.   
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Table 3 
Summary statistics by the level of family shares 
 
Variable 
Low Family Share (N = 321) High Family Share (N = 311) 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Total Cap              
(millions) 3,769.45 2,300.00 3,335.67 2,300.00 
Average Cap            
(millions) 421.74 275.00 389.96 267.72 
Total Compensation      
(millions) 2,209.30 1,284.50 1,955.15 1,282.10 
Average Compensation   
(millions) 241.71 158.56 223.13 151.13 
Cap-Pay Difference 57.32% 49.73% 55.84% 45.53% 
Excess Total Cap        
(millions) 126.58 -224.56 -129.17 -198.10 
Excess Average Cap      
(millions) 6.63 -27.74 -6.77 -16.10 
Excess Total 
Compensation 
(millions) 
60.32 -286.11 -61.56 -99.34 
Excess Average 
Compensation 
(millions) 
2.21 -22.05 -2.25 -11.53 
Market Value           
(billions) 2,787,977 505,357 2,399,149 542,784 
Δln(Market Value) 32.75% 29.34% 30.55% 22.23% 
Return 27.34% 26.32% 24.65% 19.91% 
 
The table reports the summary statistics for the full sample of 158 KOPSI 200 firms from 2003 to 2007 by 
the level of family shares.  Low/High Family is determined by the median of the family share at the 
previous year.  Total Salary Cap is the maximum amount of compensation that firm may pay to all of its 
executives, directors, and auditors.  Average Salary Cap is calculated by dividing Total Salary Cap by the 
number of all executives, directors, and auditors. Total Compensation is the total compensation for all 
executives, auditors, and directors, and Average Compensation is calculated by dividing Total 
Compensation by the number of executives, directors, and auditors.  Excess Salary Cap and Compensation 
is estimated by the residual of regressing the level of salary cap or compensation on log of asset, previous 
return, industry dummies, year dummies.  Market Value is the market value of the firm and Return is log 
difference between current and previous year-end stock prices.  We test the equal mean and median using t 
and wilcoxon statistics.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, 
respectively.   
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Table 4 
Correlation analysis, Excess cap vs. Excess compensation 
 
Correlation Excess Total Cap Excess Average Cap 
N 790  790  
Excess Total Compensation 0.94*** (0.00)  
Excess Average 
Compensation 
0.90*** 
  
(0.00) 
 
The table reports the correlations between Excess salary cap and excess compensation. Excess Salary Cap 
and Compensation is estimated by the residual of regressing the level of salary cap or compensation on log 
of asset, previous return, industry dummies, year dummies.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 5  
Cap-performance sensitivity for full sample 
 
 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests for the full sample (see the Table 1).  The dependent 
variable of Models I and II is the log change of total cash compensation, and the dependent variable of 
Models III and IV is the log change of average cash compensation.  Performancet-1 in Models I and III is 
lagged log change in market values between t-2 and t-1, and Performancet-1 in Models II and IV is lagged 
stock return, which is calculated by ln(Price)t-1 – ln(Price)t-2.   ∆ROAt-1 is the change of the returns on 
assets in the previous year.  ∆ln(Sales)t-1  is calculated by ln(Sales)t-1 – ln(Sales)t-2.  COMPENSATIONt-1 is 
the first lagged variable of each dependent variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in the number of all 
directors, executives, and auditors in the current year.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
  
Model I II III IV
N 790 790 790 790
 R2 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.31
6.20*** 4.97*** 23.53*** 13.92***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.17 0.17 0.21*** 0.20***
(0.19) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00)
0.06** 0.07*** 0.08** 0.07**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04)
0.17 0.18 0.08 0.13
(0.36) (0.28) (0.77) (0.57)
0.10* 0.09* 0.07 0.08
(0.07) (0.06) (0.44) (0.37)
-0.24*** -0.24*** -0.36*** -0.36***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conglomerate Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept
Performancet-1
F-statistic
ΔNUMDIRt
ΔROAt-1
Δln(SALES)t-1
 COMPENSATIONt-1
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Table 6  
Cap-performance sensitivity by the level of foreign shares 
 
 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests by the level of foreign shares (see the Table 2).  
Low/High Foreign is determined by the median of the foreign share at the previous year.  The dependent 
variable of Models I and II is the log change of total cash compensation, and the dependent variable of 
Models III and IV is the log change of average cash compensation.  Performancet-1 in Models I and III is 
lagged log change in market values between t-2 and t-1, and Performancet-1 in Models II and IV is lagged 
stock return, which is calculated by ln(Price)t-1 – ln(Price)t-2.   ∆ROAt-1 is the change of the returns on 
assets in the previous year.  ∆ln(Sales)t-1  is calculated by ln(Sales)t-1 – ln(Sales)t-2.  COMPENSATIONt-1 is 
the first lagged variable of each dependent variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in the number of all 
directors, executives, and auditors in the current year.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% confidence level, respectively.  
Foreign Share
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 395 395 395 395 395 395 395 395
 R2 0.47 0.48 0.40 0.40 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.44
4.93*** 15.85*** 5.44*** 65.06*** 19.38*** 4.42*** 85.25*** 43.46***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.19*** 0.17*** 0.00 0.00 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.98) (0.97) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.00 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.10** 0.13*** 0.15** 0.14**
(0.90) (0.21) (0.69) (0.46) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03)
0.13 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.51 0.43 0.78* 0.75*
(0.57) (0.69) (0.92) (0.91) (0.17) (0.25) (0.08) (0.10)
0.09 0.07 0.18 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00
(0.26) (0.31) (0.14) (0.15) (0.31) (0.28) (0.99) (0.98)
-0.26*** -0.27*** -0.38*** -0.39*** -0.21*** -0.19*** -0.35*** -0.35***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.02**
(0.21) (0.24) (0.03) (0.03)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conglomerate Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
High
Intercept
Low
F-statistic
 COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
Performancet-1
ΔROAt-1
Δln(SALES)t-1
84 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Cap-performance sensitivity by the level of family shares 
 
 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests by the level of family shares (see the Table 3).  
Low/High Family is determined by the median of the family share at the previous year.  The dependent 
variable of Models I and II is the log change of total cash compensation, and the dependent variable of 
Models III and IV is the log change of average cash compensation.  Performancet-1 in Models I and III is 
lagged log change in market values between t-2 and t-1, and Performancet-1 in Models II and IV is lagged 
stock return, which is calculated by ln(Price)t-1 – ln(Price)t-2.   ∆ROAt-1 is the change of the returns on 
assets in the previous year.  ∆ln(Sales)t-1  is calculated by ln(Sales)t-1 – ln(Sales)t-2.  COMPENSATIONt-1 is 
the first lagged variable of each dependent variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in the number of all 
directors, executives, and auditors in the current year.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
  
Family Share
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 397 397 397 397 393 393 393 393
 R2 0.48 0.48 0.44 0.44 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.53
4.46*** 7.64*** 245.70*** 85639*** 5.15*** 5.25*** 6.71*** 5.27***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.33*** 0.33*** 0.25*** 0.25*** -0.06 -0.08 0.26** 0.21**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.43) (0.13) (0.02) (0.02)
0.03 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.10* 0.13*** 0.12 0.10
(0.40) (0.42) (0.24) (0.59) (0.05) (0.01) (0.13) (0.16)
0.03 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.07 0.14 -0.15 -0.03
(0.96) (0.94) (0.96) (0.84) (0.82) (0.56) (0.70) (0.94)
0.03 0.03 -0.15 -0.14 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.16
(0.85) (0.86) (0.48) (0.55) (0.27) (0.25) (0.42) (0.38)
-0.24*** -0.24*** -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.32*** -0.34***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 0.01*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conglomerate Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Low High
F-statistic
Intercept
Performancet-1
ΔROAt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
Δln(SALES)t-1
 COMPENSATIONt-1
85 
 
 
 
Table 8  
Cap-performance sensitivity by the level of foreign and family shares 
 
Panel A. When Foreign share is low 
 
  
Family Share
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 198 198 198 198 197 197 197 197
 R2 0.63 0.63 0.53 0.53 0.69 0.70 0.65 0.64
401.85*** 99.55*** 2.64*** 4.33*** 1.65*** 28.84*** 0.92 0.78
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.67) (0.89)
0.15 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.22** 0.19*** 0.06 0.08
(0.25) (0.25) (0.65) (0.65) (0.01) (0.01) (0.73) (0.63)
-0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.05
(0.73) (0.58) (0.83) (0.80) (0.98) (0.24) (0.50) (0.67)
0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.12 0.10 -0.40 -0.32
(0.98) (0.97) (0.95) (0.98) (0.75) (0.78) (0.39) (0.47)
0.19 0.21 -0.01 0.01 0.13 0.11 0.45* 0.45
(0.42) (0.41) (0.96) (0.97) (0.42) (0.47) (0.10) (0.11)
-0.26 -0.26 -0.33*** -0.32*** -0.35*** -0.37*** -0.46*** -0.47***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.22) (0.20) (0.88) (0.98)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conglomerate Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ΔNUMDIRt
Performancet-1
Low High
F-statistic
Intercept
ΔROAt-1
Δln(SALES)t-1
 COMPENSATIONt-1
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Panel B. When Foreign share is high 
 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests by the level of family shares (see the Table 3).  
Low/High Family is determined by the median of the family share at the previous year.  The dependent 
variable of Models I and II is the log change of total cash compensation, and the dependent variable of 
Models III and IV is the log change of average cash compensation.  Performancet-1 in Models I and III is 
lagged log change in market values between t-2 and t-1, and Performancet-1 in Models II and IV is lagged 
stock return, which is calculated by ln(Price)t-1 – ln(Price)t-2.  ∆ROAt-1 is the change of the returns on assets 
in the previous year.  ∆ln(Sales)t-1  is calculated by ln(Sales)t-1 – ln(Sales)t-2.  COMPENSATIONt-1 is the 
first lagged variable of each dependent variable.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in the number of all directors, 
executives, and auditors in the current year.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
confidence level, respectively. 
  
Family Share
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 199 199 199 199 196 196 196 196
 R2 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76
7.85*** 2.58*** 49.57*** 13.07*** 38.92*** 7.10*** 15.00*** 6.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.32*** 0.32*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.00 -0.05 0.69 0.62
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.99) (0.89) (0.10) (0.16)
0.12 0.16* 0.18 0.20** 0.17 0.18* 0.11 0.07
(0.26) (0.08) (0.12) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.38) (0.58)
0.15 0.10 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.11 0.98 1.11
(0.87) (0.91) (0.79) (0.83) (0.83) (0.90) (0.28) (0.22)
-0.12 -0.14 -0.43 -0.43 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.08
(0.58) (0.55) (0.33) (0.32) (0.93) (0.74) (0.84) (0.78)
-0.22* -0.21* -0.28 -0.28* -0.22 -0.23 -0.33*** -0.35***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00)
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.19) (0.19) (0.12) (0.19)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conglomerate Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Low High
F-statistic
Intercept
 COMPENSATIONt-1
ΔNUMDIRt
Performancet-1
ΔROAt-1
Δln(SALES)t-1
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Table 9 
The cause of cap-pay difference for the full sample 
 
Variable Total Compensation Average Compensation 
N 790  790  
 R2 0.76  0.78  
F-statistic 260.43*** 1241.53*** (0.00) (0.00) 
Intercept 3.95** 4.19** (0.03) (0.01) 
Excess Cap 0.04 0.55* (0.21) (0.07) 
Excess Pay -0.22*** -0.22*** (0.00) (0.00) 
ln(Assett-1) 
-0.25** -0.26*** 
(0.02) (0.01) 
Returnt-1 
-0.03 -0.03 
(0.20) (0.16) 
ROAt-1 
-0.06 -0.05 
(0.75) (0.79) 
Optiont-1 
0.06 -0.14** 
(0.46) (0.05) 
ln(SALESt-1) 
-0.13* 0.06 
(0.08) (0.45) 
NUMDIRt 
-0.02** 
(0.01)   
Industry Dummy Yes Yes 
Conglomerate Dummy Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests between cap-pay difference and excess salary cap and 
compensation for the full sample (See Table 1).  .  Excess Cap and Excess Pay is estimated by the residual 
of regressing the level of salary cap or compensation on log of asset, previous return, industry dummies, 
year dummies.  Difference is the gap between salary cap and actual compensation in the same year.  Assett-
1 is the dollar amount of asset in the previous year.  Returnt-1 is calculated by ln(Price)t-1 – ln(Price)t-2.  
ROAt-1 is the returns on assets in the previous year.  Optiont-1 is the dummy variable, 1 if there are any 
existing stock options in the previous year, 0 otherwise.  Salest-1 is the dollar amount of sales in the 
previous year.  NUMDIRt is the number of all directors, executives, and auditors in the current year.  ***, 
**, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 10  
The cause of cap-pay difference by the level of foreign share 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the result of the regression tests between cap-pay difference and excess salary cap and 
compensation by the different level of foreign shares (see the Table 2).  Low/High Foreign is determined 
by the median of the foreign share at the previous year.  Excess Cap and Excess Pay is estimated by the 
residual of regressing the level of salary cap or compensation on log of asset, previous return, industry 
dummies, year dummies.  Difference is the gap between salary cap and actual compensation in the same 
year.  Assett-1 is the dollar amount of asset in the previous year.  Returnt-1 is calculated by ln(Price)t-1 – 
ln(Price)t-2.  ROAt-1 is the returns on assets in the previous year.  Optiont-1 is the dummy variable, 1 if there 
are any existing stock options in the previous year, 0 otherwise.  Salest-1 is the dollar amount of sales in the 
previous year.  NUMDIRt is the number of all directors, executives, and auditors in the current year.  ***, 
**, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
Foreign Share
Variable Total Compensation Average Compensation Total Compensation
Average 
Compensation
N 395 395 395 395
 R2 0.88 0.89 0.78 0.80
7077.53*** 194.17*** 28.11*** 84.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1.40 2.57 5.65 5.98*
(0.53) (0.21) (0.15) (0.10)
0.15*** 1.71*** 0.02 0.38
(0.00) (0.00) (0.29) (0.12)
-0.34*** -0.32*** -0.20*** -0.20***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.10 -0.12 -0.30 -0.32*
(0.32) (0.20) (0.10) (0.06)
-0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
(0.33) (0.13) (0.87) (0.84)
0.02 0.01 0.28 0.24
(0.90) (0.96) (0.60) (0.63)
0.07 -0.13 0.04 -0.09
(0.28) (0.24) (0.83) (0.52)
-0.10 0.03 -0.09 0.04
(0.37) (0.60) (0.55) (0.80)
-0.03*** -0.01
(0.00) (0.45)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conglomerate Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
High
Excess Cap
Excess Pay
ln(Assett-1)
Returnt-1
ROAt-1
Optiont-1
SALESt-1
NUMDIRt
Low
F-statistic
Intercept
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Table 11 
Incentive-performance sensitivity for full sample 
 
  
This table reports the result of regression between the incentives measured by the difference between future 
salary cap and current compensation and the previous performance for the full sample (See Table 1).  The 
dependent variable of Models I and II is the log difference between total salary cap at t and total cash 
compensation at t-1, and the dependent variable of Models III and IV is the log difference between average 
salary cap at t and average cash compensation at t-1.  Performancet-1 in Models I and III is lagged log 
change in market values between t-2 and t-1, and Performancet-1 in Models II and IV is lagged stock return, 
which is calculated by ln(Price)t-1 – ln(Price)t-2.  ∆ROAt-1 is the change of the returns on assets in the 
previous year.  ∆ln(Sales)t-1  is calculated by ln(Sales)t-1 – ln(Sales)t-2.  Optiont-1 is the dummy variable, 1 if 
there are any existing stock options in the previous year, 0 otherwise.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in the 
number of all directors, executives, and auditors in the current year.  ***, **, and * denote the significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
  
Model I II III IV
N 790 790 790 790
 R2 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.31
6.20*** 4.97*** 23.53*** 13.92***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.17 0.17 0.21*** 0.20***
(0.19) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00)
0.06** 0.07*** 0.08** 0.07**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04)
0.17 0.18 0.08 0.13
(0.36) (0.28) (0.77) (0.57)
0.10* 0.09* 0.07 0.08
(0.07) (0.06) (0.44) (0.37)
-0.24*** -0.24*** -0.36*** -0.36***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conglomerate Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic
Intercept
Performancet-1
ΔROAt-1
Δln(SALES)t-1
Optiont-1
ΔNUMDIRt
90 
 
 
 
Table 12 
Incentive-performance sensitivity by the level of foreign shares 
 
 
 
This table reports the result of regression between the incentives measured by the difference between future 
salary cap and current compensation and the previous performance by the level of foreign shares (See 
Table 2).  Low/High Foreign is determined by the median of the foreign share at the previous year.  The 
dependent variable of Models I and II is the log difference between total salary cap at t and total cash 
compensation at t-1, and the dependent variable of Models III and IV is the log difference between average 
salary cap at t and average cash compensation at t-1.  Performancet-1 in Models I and III is lagged log 
change in market values between t-2 and t-1, and Performancet-1 in Models II and IV is lagged stock return, 
which is calculated by ln(Price)t-1 – ln(Price)t-2.  ∆ROAt-1 is the change of the returns on assets in the 
previous year.  ∆ln(Sales)t-1  is calculated by ln(Sales)t-1 – ln(Sales)t-2.  Optiont-1 is the dummy variable, 1 if 
there are any existing stock options in the previous year, 0 otherwise.  ∆NUMDIRt is the change in the 
number of all directors, executives, and auditors in the current year.  ***, **, and * denote the significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
 
 
  
Foreign Share
Model I II III IV I II III IV
N 395 395 395 395 395 395 395 395
 R2 0.68 0.67 0.57 0.57 0.69 0.69 0.63 0.63
79.55*** 53.59*** 85.68*** 18.32*** 27.79*** 58.52*** 36.22*** 96.36***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.46*** 0.42*** 0.23 0.20 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.31*** 0.31***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.10* 0.08 0.14* 0.08
(0.37) (0.56) (0.59) (0.79) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.26)
-0.14 -0.25 -0.11 -0.18 0.43 0.42 0.65 0.71
(0.68) (0.49) (0.81) (0.69) (0.34) (0.36) (0.23) (0.20)
0.08 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.09
(0.50) (0.63) (0.42) (0.48) (0.91) (0.91) (0.55) (0.59)
0.10 0.12 0.16 0.18 -0.19 -0.18 -0.35*** -0.35***
(0.39) (0.30) (0.31) (0.27) (0.16) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00)
0.02** 0.02** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conglomerate Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Low High
F-statistic
Intercept
Optiont-1
ΔNUMDIRt
Performancet-1
ΔROAt-1
Δln(SALES)t-1
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Table 13 
Firm value by the level foreign shares and managerial incentives 
 
Incentive Low Low 
Foreign Share Low High 
N 197 198 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median 
Tobin's Q 1.13 1.00** 1.18 1.04 (0.13) (0.01) (0.97) (0.54) 
Market-to-
Book 
1.37 1.00** 1.38 1.14 
(0.18) (0.02) (0.22) (0.68) 
Incentive High High 
Foreign Share Low High 
N 198 197 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median 
Tobin's Q 1.13 0.97*** 1.31*** 1.20*** (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Market-to-
Book 
1.39 0.89*** 1.82*** 1.44*** 
(0.27) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
This table reports the result of computing firm values of the samples split by the level of foreign shares and 
the difference between future salary cap and current compensation (managerial incentives).  Low/High 
Foreign is determined by the median of the foreign share at the previous year.  We test the equal mean and 
median using t and wilcoxon statistics comparing with other three groups.  ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 14  
Firm value by the level pay-performance sensitivity and managerial incentives 
 
Incentive Low Low 
PPS Low High 
N 42  37  
Variables Mean Median Mean Median 
Tobin's Q 1.13 1.09 1.15 0.97 (0.32) (0.61) (0.59) (0.30) 
Market-to-
Book 
1.31 1.20 1.33 0.89 
(0.21) (0.61) (0.31) (0.15) 
Incentive High High 
PPS Low High 
N 37  42  
Variables Mean Median Mean Median 
Tobin's Q 1.18 1.05 1.28 1.20** (0.92) (0.34) (0.11) (0.02) 
Market-to-
Book 
1.36 1.13 1.91*** 1.49*** 
(0.41) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
This table reports the result of computing firm values of the samples split by the level of estimated pay-
performance sensitivity of each firm and the difference between future salary cap and current compensation 
(managerial incentives).   We estimate the pay-performance sensitivity using the beta coefficient of the 
univariate regression between the log changes of average compensation and the stock returns of the 
previous year.  We test the equal mean and median using t and wilcoxon statistics comparing with other 
three groups.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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